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INTRODUCTION: THE FAMILY SMOKING PREVENTION AND
TOBACCO CONTROL ACT
The United States has required cigarette packages to display
warning labels since the 1960s.1 The first warning label stated simply,
“Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health.”2 In 1984,
Congress passed the Comprehensive Smoking Education Act
requiring tobacco companies to display on every cigarette package
four periodically-rotating health warnings.3
The Act specified
language for the four warning labels,4 and required them to “appear
in conspicuous and legible type in contrast by typography, layout, or
color with all other printed material on the package.”5 Cigarette
companies customarily printed the warnings in black and white down
one side of the package. As other countries adopted more aggressive
warning labels to combat smoking, the United States’ regulatory
structure went unchanged for twenty-five years.6
On June 22, 2009, President Obama signed the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act7 (“Tobacco Control Act” or
“Act”) into law.8 It gave the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) the authority to regulate the manufacture and sale of tobacco
products. The Tobacco Control Act mandates that every cigarette
package include one of nine concise phrases highlighting the
deleterious effects of smoking.9 The term “WARNING” is to be
printed in all capital letters and seventeen-point font.10 The Tobacco
Control Act requires the warnings to cover the top half of both the
front and back of the cigarette package.11 Finally, the Act directed
the FDA to promulgate “color graphics depicting the negative health
consequences of smoking to accompany” the textual warnings.12 The
1. Ranit Mishori, Packing a Heavier Warning: Elsewhere, Cigarette Boxes Bear
Graphic Evidence of Smoking’s Ill Effects; U.S. Labels Will Soon Do the Same,
POST,
Aug.
4,
2009,
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-08WASH.
04/news/36819543_1_cigarette-labels-pictorial-warnings-result-in-fetal-injury.
2. Id.
3. Pub. L. No. 98-474, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Mishori, supra note 1.
7. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
1333, 4402 (2012) and 21 U.S.C. § 387a-1 (2012)).
8. See 21 U.S.C. § 387b (2012).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1).
10. See id. § 1333(a)(2).
11. See id.
12. See id. § 1333(d).
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FDA was to develop the new graphic warning labels within two
years.13
A day before the two-year deadline, on June 21, 2011, the FDA
unveiled the nine new warning labels,14 and on June 22, 2011, the
FDA published its Final Rule implementing them.15 The FDA had
selected the nine graphical labels from a group of thirty-six proposed
images after comprehensive studies of the effectiveness of each.16 The
chosen images included photographs and illustrations depicting a
comparison of a diseased lung to a healthy lung, an autopsied torso, a
set of teeth and gums ravaged by smoking, a cartoon image of child in
an incubator, a close-up of a tracheotomy, a woman—perhaps a
mother?—blowing smoke into a child’s face, a distraught woman, a
man attached to a respirator, and a man posing in a t-shirt on which is
printed an anti-smoking slogan.17 One of the statute’s corresponding
Also
textual warnings respectively accompanies each image.18
included in the graphic warning is the text “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” the
phone number for an anti-smoking hotline.19 Under the Tobacco
Control Act, the new warnings become effective fifteen months after
the rule’s publication.20 This meant that every new package of

13. See id.
14. See Press Release, FDA, FDA Unveils Final Cigarette Warning Labels (June
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/
21,
2011),
PressAnnouncements/ucm260181.htm.
15. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed.
Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011).
16. See FDA, supra note 14.
17. See Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/
Labeling/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last updated Aug. 22, 2012).
18. The nine messages are:
WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive.
WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children.
WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease.
WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer.
WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease.
WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby.
WARNING: Smoking can kill you.
WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers.
WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your
health.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1); FDA, supra note 17.
19. See FDA, supra note 17.
20. Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009).
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cigarettes sold after October 22, 2012, was to bear one of the nine new
graphic warning labels—absent judicial action.21
On August 16, 2011, shortly after FDA unveiled the new warning
labels, five tobacco companies, led by R.J. Reynolds, filed suit in the
District of the District of Columbia.22 On August 19, 2011, in R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, the tobacco companies moved for
summary judgment and requested a permanent injunction to prevent
the FDA from enforcing the new warning labels.23 The tobacco
companies challenged the new warning labels, in part, on First
Amendment grounds as unconstitutionally compelled speech.24 The
crux of the tobacco companies’ First Amendment argument was that
the new cigarette warnings do not satisfy standards articulated by the
Supreme Court in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of
Ohio,25 in which the Court established a highly lenient standard for
regulations that compel disclosures in commercial speech.26 The
tobacco companies argued that, because the standard articulated in
Zauderer is inapplicable and the government has compelled them,
private entities, to convey its ideological message, the new warning
labels should be subjected to, and will fail, strict scrutiny.27
In the midst of the R.J. Reynolds litigation, the Western District of
Kentucky and, subsequently, the Sixth Circuit was already
considering a similar challenge to the underlying statutory provision
of the Tobacco Control Act creating the graphic warning labels. The
Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in Discount Tobacco City & Liquor,
Inc. v. United States on March 19, 2012.
On February 29, 2012, the District of the District of Columbia
granted the tobacco companies summary judgment,28 thereby
reinforcing its earlier decision preliminarily enjoining the graphic
warning labels.29 In doing so, the D.C. District Court ruled that
Zauderer did not supply the appropriate standard of analysis for the
21. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 42 (D.D.C. 2011).
22. Id. at 39.
23. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction, R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No.
10.
24. See id. at 29–49.
25. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
26. Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 31–36,
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF
No. 10.
27. Id. at 25–30.
28. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012).
29. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
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new graphic warning labels—or, put another way, Zauderer’s narrow
exception to Supreme Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence had
not been satisfied.30 The D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments in R.J.
Reynolds on April 10, 2012, and weighed in with its opinion on
August 24, 2012.
Part I of this Note explores the development of the Supreme
Court’s compelled speech and commercial speech jurisprudence, the
two threads of jurisprudence informing the lenient standard for
compelled commercial disclosure developed in Zauderer.31 Next, this
Note delves into the Court’s reasoning in Zauderer, attempting to
understand its relationship within the broader context of the Court’s
compelled speech jurisprudence and its commercial speech
jurisprudence.32 Part I concludes by analyzing subsequent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with compelled disclosures to shed light on
the scope and limits of the Zauderer exception.33
Part II focuses on the two recent decisions regarding the new
cigarette warning labels, Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v.
United States34 and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, and situates
them within the constellation of approaches taken to Zauderer.35
Part III attempts to provide a coherent unifying approach to
Zauderer that respects each strand of the Court’s reasoning and—in
light of that unified approach—evaluates the recent decisions
regarding the graphic cigarette warning labels.36
I. PATHS TO ZAUDERER
The decision in Zauderer sits at the crossroads of two separate
lines of First Amendment jurisprudence. The first is the presumptive
invalidity of laws forcing private individuals to speak against their
will.
The second suggests that the First Amendment allows
encroachments upon commercial speech it would not accept upon
political, religious, or ideological speech. One question a court
interpreting Zauderer must address is how that decision comports
with these two broader First Amendment principles.

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See R.J. Reynolds, 845 F. Supp. 2d at 272–75.
See infra notes 37–109 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 110–32 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 133–78 and accompanying text.
674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).

See infra notes 180–376 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 377–433 and accompanying text.
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A. Origins of the Prohibition Against Compelled Speech
The notion that the First Amendment protects an individual’s right

not to speak just as it protects an individual’s right to speak begins
with the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette.37 In 1943, the Court in Barnette struck down a
West Virginia State Board of Education resolution that mandated
that school children salute the American flag with raised right hand
and upturned palm.38 Only three years earlier, the Supreme Court
had upheld a Pennsylvania public school’s authority to mandate that
its students salute the American flag and recite the Pledge of
Allegiance.39 In the wake of that earlier decision, the West Virginia
legislature directed its schools to foster and perpetuate the “ideals,
principles and spirit of Americanism.”40 In response, the West
Virginia Board of Education adopted the resolution at issue in
Barnette.41 A student who failed to conform to the state’s Pledge of
Allegiance mandate risked expulsion and a criminal truancy charge.42
A group of Jehovah’s Witnesses, for whom honoring the flag
amounted to idolatry and conflicted with deeply held religious beliefs,
challenged the resolution.43
The Barnette Court overturned its earlier decision in Minersville
and held that a public school could not compel a student to recite the
pledge or salute the flag.44 The Court grounded its decision in the
First Amendment generally, without specifying which of its clauses
the law violated.45 The case potentially implicated both the Free
Exercise clause and the Free Speech clause.46 The Court opaquely
37. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See generally Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The
Story of West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette: The Pledge of
Allegiance and the Freedom of Thought, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 409
(Michael C. Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009).
38. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 628, 642.
39. See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), overruled by
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624.
40. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 625.
41. See id. at 626.
42. See id. at 629.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 642.
45. See id.
46. Scholars have commented on how difficult it is to pin down the precise First
Amendment foundations for the Court’s reasoning in Barnette; the Court’s language
is broad, general and, at times, “aphoristic.” See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 37 at
430–31; Abner Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
451, 463–64 (1995); Nat Stern, The Subordinate Status of Negative Speech Rights, 59
BUFF. L. REV. 847, 852 (2011).
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stated, “We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limits on their power
and invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of
the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official
control.”47 Elsewhere the Court stated the plaintiff’s challenge
“[stood] on a right of self-determination in matters that touch
individual opinion and personal attitude.”48 Regardless of the precise
constitutional underpinnings, the Court understood the injury as one
solely inflicted upon the individual compelled to speak and harmful
because it implicated that speaker’s core values.49 Although Barnette
initiated a line of jurisprudence that would establish the constitutional
presumption against laws compelling speech, the Court left the roots
of the doctrine unclear. This lack of clarity in turn left the extant
protection and its limits vague as well.
Miami Herald Publishing v. Tornillo was the second case to
recognize First Amendment protection against compelled speech.
Like Barnette, Tornillo remained ambiguous about the precise
constitutional underpinnings for the prohibition against compelled
speech.50 The case addressed the Miami Herald’s challenge to
Florida’s right-of-reply statute.51 The Court held that “[c]ompelling
editors or publishers to publish that which ‘reason tells them should
not be published’” violated the First Amendment guarantees on
Freedom of the Press.52 The Court explicitly rejected the idea that
regulations that merely compelled speech—like the Florida right-ofreply statute—were relevantly different from outright restrictions.53
Throughout the decision, the Court wavered, at times basing
protections against compelled speech in the First Amendment

47. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
48. Id. at 631.
49. Laurent Sacharoff identifies three arguments, all centered around violations
of what the Court in Barnette calls the speaker’s “freedom of mind,” put forth by the
Court in Barnette. That coercion might, first, improperly change the speaker’s
beliefs; second, create cynicism about core beliefs; and, third, invalidate consent. See
Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44 CAL. W. L.
REV. 329, 342–43 (2008).
50. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
51. Id. at 245.
52. Id. at 256 (quoting Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 n.18
(1943)). Previously the Court had upheld a similar FCC rule requiring broadcasters
to grant third parties airtime without charge to respond to personal criticisms of the
third party by the station. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
53. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.
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generally, at others basing them in the Free Press clause specifically.54
Following Tornillo, the Court had yet to conclusively establish that
the First Amendment protects individuals against compelled speech
even when neither religious belief nor freedom of the press is at
stake.
It was not until Wooley v. Maynard that the Court isolated the
Free Speech clause as an independently sufficient source of
constitutional protection against compelled speech.55 In Wooley, the
Court faced another challenge by a Jehovah’s Witness to a state
action that the Witness found “morally, ethically, religiously and
politically abhorrent,” this time in the inclusion of the New
Hampshire state slogan “Live Free or Die” on his license plates.56
Due to his attempts to cover the slogan or snip it off, the plaintiff was
cited multiple times under state law for obstructing the figures on his
vehicle’s plates.57 The Court began its analysis by declaring, “freedom
of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action
includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from
speaking at all.”58
Once the Wooley Court declared that the First Amendment
protected individuals against compelled speech, it proceeded to
determine whether the state had a “sufficiently compelling”
countervailing interest to justify compelling speech.59
New
Hampshire offered two alternative interests in mandating that license
plates bear the state motto.60 First, the state argued that because only
the plates issued to passenger vehicles displayed the motto, police
officers could more readily determine if a vehicle was properly
plated.61 Aside from skepticism of the state’s reasoning, the Court
also criticized the state for using a means disproportionate to the goal,
stating “[The state’s] purpose cannot be pursued by means that

54. Compare id. at 254 (“If it is governmental coercion, this at once brings about a
confrontation with the express provisions of the First Amendment and the judicial
gloss on that Amendment developed over the years.” (emphasis added)), with id. at
258 (“It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial
process can be exercised consistent with the guarantees of a free press as they have
evolved over time.” (emphasis added)).
55. 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
56. Id. at 713.
57. See id. at 712.
58. Id. at 714.
59. See id. at 715–16.
60. Id. at 716.
61. Id.
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broadly stifle fundamental liberty interests when the end can be more
narrowly achieved.”62
The state proffered a second interest to justify compelling the
vehicle owner’s to bear its message, the communication of a “proper
appreciation of history, state pride and individualism.”63 This
rationale, too, was found to be lacking. Unlike Barnette, in which the
Court judiciously had rebutted West Virginia’s attempt to instill civic
ideals by declaring those ideals better served by voluntary
endorsement,64 the Court in Wooley tersely dispensed of New
Hampshire’s attempt at civics, stating, “where the State’s interest is to
disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such
interest cannot outweigh an individual’s First Amendment right to
avoid becoming the courier for such message.”65 Thus, Wooley
suggests that the state’s interest in fostering or advocating an
ideology—any ideology—can never be “sufficiently compelling”
enough to justify compelled speech, no matter how closely tailored or
non-burdensome the law.66
Nothing in the reasoning in the Barnette or Tornillo decisions
resembles any degree of systematic means-ends scrutiny.67 In this
regard, Wooley is the first to engage in such scrutiny. In Wooley,
although the Court maintained its presumption that compelled speech
is unconstitutional, the Court suggested that it would uphold laws
compelling speech as long as the state provided a “sufficiently
compelling” interest and employed proportionate and least restrictive
means to achieve its goal.68
The Court’s next compelled speech decision, Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, dealt not with legislation compelling speech, but
with a California State Supreme Court decision compelling access for
pamphleteers to a privately owned shopping center.69 The owner of
the shopping center appealed the state court’s decision to the U.S.
Supreme Court and argued that forcing him to grant the
62. Id. at 716–17 (“The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the
light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose.” (quoting Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
63. Id. at 717.
64. See W. Va. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 640–41 (1943).
65. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717.
66. See id.
67. See Barnette, 319 U.S. 624; see also Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241, 241 (1974).
68. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 716–17.
69. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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pamphleteers access compelled him “to participate in the
dissemination of an ideological message,” thus infringing on his right
not to speak.70 The Supreme Court rejected his challenge. It held
that compelled access did not infringe the owner’s First Amendment
rights.71 The Court provided two rationales to distinguish Wooley and
Barnette. First, according to the Court, each of those cases involved a
governmentally proscribed message.72 Second, the Court stated that
the owner was free to disavow the views of the pamphleteers,
whereas, presumably in the Court’s view, the Jehovah’s Witnesses in
Wooley or Barnette could not adequately disassociate themselves
from the Pledge or New Hampshire’s state motto.73 The Court went
on to distinguish Tornillo because the right of access sought in that
case would have impinged on a newspaper’s editorial prerogative.74
Pruneyard offers an anomalous instance in which the Court upheld
a government action compelling speech. The Court’s labored
attempts to distinguish Pruneyard in later compelled speech
decisions—by unconvincingly emphasizing that the Pruneyard
plaintiff had not objected to the content of the speech nor claimed
that compelled access inhibited his own right to speak—indicate how
uncomfortably Pruneyard fits with the Court’s compelled speech
jurisprudence.75
Still, Pruneyard is consistent with the Court’s other decisions
insofar as it recognized a unique concern when the government
compels a private individual to spread the government’s own message
to the exclusion of other messages.76 What makes the decision in
Pruneyard an outlier is not that it upheld a law compelling speech,
but rather that it found decisive constitutional relevance in the fact
that the compelled message belonged to a third party rather than the
government. Like Pruneyard, the decision in Tornillo considered

70. Id. at 86–87.
71. Id. at 88.
72. Id.
73. See id. at 88.
74. Id. at 88.
75. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian, & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557,
580 (1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 12 (1986).
76. See, e.g., W. Va. Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or
petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.”).
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whether a state could compel a private individual to convey the
message of another private individual.77
The Court’s decision in Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public
Utilities Commission, decided a few months after Zauderer, is more
consistent than Pruneyard with the Court’s developing compelled
speech jurisprudence. As such, the Court’s reasoning in Pacific Gas is
at odds with its reasoning in Pruneyard.78 In Pacific Gas, the Court
held that the state of California could not force Pacific Gas & Electric
Company (PG & E) to include opposing political views in the utility
company’s billing envelopes.79 In doing so, the Court ignored the
distinction crucial to its reasoning in Pruneyard. Pacific Gas suggests
there is no constitutional difference between a law that compels the
speaker to foster the government’s view and one that compels the
individual to foster a private party’s message.80
Both are
constitutionally suspect.
Moreover, the Court rejected the
proposition that the right of a corporate speaker not to be compelled
differs from an individual’s right.81 Pacific Gas solidified the notion
that the First Amendment protects speakers, whether corporations or
individuals, from being compelled to spread someone else’s message,
regardless of whether it is from the government or a third party.
Apart from ignoring whose message has been compelled, a second
aspect by which the Court’s reasoning in Pacific Gas is at odds with
that in Pruneyard is the salience given to a compelled speaker’s
ability to disavow the compelled message. In Pruneyard, the Court
posited the owner’s ability to disavow the pamphleteers’ message as a
reason to view the pamphleteers’ access as less problematic.82 In
contrast, in Pacific Gas the Court characterized PG & E’s foreseeable
disavowal of any opposing views carried in its envelopes as secondary
compulsion that only compounded the First Amendment injury.83
The court stated, “The danger that [PG & E] will be required to alter
its own message as a consequence of the government’s coercive action
is a proper object of First Amendment solicitude . . . .”84

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 243 (1974).
Compare Pruneyard, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), with Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. 1 (1986).
Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 20–22.
See id.
See id. at 8.
See Pruneyard, 447 U.S. at 88.
See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S. at 16.
Id. at 16.
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Once it established that the First Amendment protected PG & E
from being compelled to speak, the Court proceeded to its analysis.85
The Court found that the state agency’s ruling was not content
neutral.86 As such, the Court, as it had in Wooley, scrutinized the
state agency’s ruling to determine if it was narrowly tailored and
served a compelling state interest.87 The state proffered two interests,
both of which the Court found compelling.88 Nonetheless, those
interests did not suffice. Rather, according to the Court, the state
could have advanced its interests through means other than forcing
PG & E to include opposing political views in its billing envelopes.89
The Court stated, “Our cases establish that the State cannot advance
some points of view by burdening the expression of others.”90 In the
end, the Court held that the state would unconstitutionally infringe
PG & E’s right not to speak if it required the electric company to
insert the political message of its opponents in its billing envelopes.91
Pacific Gas arguably illustrates the Court’s most systematic analysis
to date of a regulation compelling speech. It demonstrates the sort of
analysis—strict scrutiny—that the tobacco companies advocated the
Court apply to the new warning labels.92 The FDA, in contrast, has
argued that if Zauderer is inapplicable, courts should apply the level
of scrutiny given to regulations that restrict commercial speech, a

85. See id. at 11.
86. Id. at 12. An infringement upon speech is “content neutral” if it affects all
speech indiscriminately regardless of the message conveyed or speaker conveying the
message. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791–92 (1989). Time, place,
and manner restrictions are the paradigmatic examples of content neutral speech
restrictions. Id. Content neutral speech restrictions are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. Content-based restrictions, restrictions that single out certain messages or
speakers, are subject to heightened constitutional scrutiny. See id.
87. See Pacific Gas, 475 U.S at 19.
88. The state asserted that requiring PG & E to include the material furthered the
state’s interest (1) in the effective proceedings to determine utility rates and (2) in
promoting speech by exposing customers to a variety of perspectives. See id. at 19–
20.
89. Id. at 19.
90. Id. at 20.
91. See id. at 20–21.
92. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction at 29,
R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No. 10; see
also Clay Calvert et al., Playing Politics or Protecting Children? Congressional

Action & a First Amendment Analysis of the Family Smoking Prevention and
Tobacco Control Act, 36 J. LEGIS. 201 (2010) (analyzing the Commonwealth Brands
litigation and similarly arguing that the warning labels should be scrutinized strictly
as traditional compelled speech). Calvert et al. omit any discussion of Zauderer. See

id.
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more lenient standard.93 This Note turns next to a brief background
of commercial speech jurisprudence before delving into Zauderer.
B.

Commercial Speech Jurisprudence

The decisions discussed thus far have involved the expression of
fully protected speech—whether they considered a law compelling
the expression of fully protected speech from a speaker who would
rather remain silent or a considered law requiring an individual to
foster the expression of a third party’s fully protected speech. First
Amendment jurisprudence, however, traditionally has not afforded
commercial speech the full range of safeguards it grants other forms
of speech.94
It was not until 1976, in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, that the Court first recognized
that the First Amendment protected commercial speech.95 The Court
reasoned that speech should not lose its First Amendment protection
simply because money was spent to project it.96 The Court based its
newly articulated protection of commercial speech on the interests of
society and consumers in the free flow of commercial information.97
Still, just as the Court extended First Amendment protections to
commercial speech for the first time, it also cabined those newfound
protections, recognizing that greater regulation of commercial speech
is permissible.98 What ultimately developed was a limited measure of
protection for commercial speech, a protection “commensurate with
its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values.”99 It
could be permissible to subject commercial speech to modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of
noncommercial speech.100 While interference with fully protected

93. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction
at 25, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 18.
94. Which level of protection the Supreme Court affords commercial speech is
currently the topic of debate. See e.g., Calvert et al., supra note 92, at 210–11. It
should be sufficient for the purposes of this Note that the Court has been willing to
make material distinctions based on the commercial nature of the speech involved.
95. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
96. Id. at 761. The Court defined commercial speech as “speech which does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.” Id. at 762.
97. Id. at 763–64.
98. See id. at 770.
99. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
100. Id. at 456.
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speech garnered strict scrutiny, interference with commercial speech
would garner some lesser degree of scrutiny.101
The Court articulated that lesser degree of scrutiny in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Service Commission.102 In
Central Hudson, the Court defined commercial speech as an
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker
and its audience.”103 Then the Court articulated a four-step test for
determining whether a regulation unconstitutionally burdened such
speech. First, a court should determine whether the speech was
deceptive or unlawful. When speech is neither unlawful nor
deceptive, the government’s ability to regulate is more
“circumscribed.” Thus, the second step requires the government to
assert a substantial interest served by the regulation.104 Third, if the
government’s interest is substantial, the proposed regulation must
directly advance that interest. Finally, the regulation must be no
more extensive than necessary to achieve the government’s goal.105
Although the four-step analysis articulated in Central Hudson
became the accepted analysis when evaluating restrictions on
commercial speech, a few Justices have expressed discomfort with or
hostility to its analysis.106 As with many tests that the Court has
articulated, its application has not been uniform.107 Furthermore,
recent decisions have called into question whether the longstanding
principle that commercial speech receives diminished First
Amendment protection remains firmly entrenched.108 Nonetheless,
Zauderer was the product of a period in which the principle that
101. See e.g, id. at 456–57.
102. 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
103. Id. at 561 (citations omitted).
104. Id. at 564.
105. Id. at 563–64.
106. Justice Thomas has consistently expressed the opinion that there is no
constitutional basis to afford commercial speech lesser protection, and that Central
Hudson’s test should be abandoned. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United
States, 559 U.S. 229, 255 (2010) (Thomas J., concurring); Thompson v. Western
States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (Thomas J., concurring); Lorillard Tobacco
Co. v Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 572 (2001) (Thomas J., concurring); see also 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517 (1996) (Scalia J., concurring).
107. See Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. 525 (majority and dissent both applying
Central Hudson to restrictions on tobacco advertising with opposing results).
108. Recently, four Justices dissented in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., arguing that
the majority, by strictly scrutinizing restrictions on the way pharmaceutical
companies may collect customer information, neglected to recognize the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2673 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
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commercial speech did not have the same constitutional pedigree as
fully protected speech was accepted. As such, when the Court in
Zauderer considered the First Amendment implications of compelled
commercial disclosure, this principle pervaded its reasoning.109
C.

Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme
Court of Ohio110

In Zauderer, the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence
intersected with its commercial speech jurisprudence. The case
involved an Ohio lawyer’s challenge to the state’s rules regulating the
content of attorneys’ advertisements. The lawyer argued that these
regulations were an infringement of his First Amendment rights.111
The lawyer challenged three disciplinary rules that the state bar had
found that the lawyer had violated. Two of the rules restricted the
content of lawyers’ advertisements; the other required attorneys who
advertise contingency rates to disclose whether clients remain liable
for costs and expenses of unsuccessful claims.112
The Court straightforwardly applied Central Hudson’s analysis to
the two challenged restrictions.113 It found that neither restriction—
one a ban on self-recommendation and unsolicited legal advice, the
other a ban on the use of illustrations in advertising—advanced a
substantial government interest. Thus, both failed Central Hudson’s
third step.114
Although it had readily used Central Hudson’s analysis to strike
down two of the state’s disciplinary rules, the Court balked at the
lawyer’s suggestion that it also apply Central Hudson to the
The Court reasoned that disclosure
disclosure requirement.115
requirements are materially different from outright prohibitions on
speech.116 According to the Court, while restrictions decrease the

109. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986)
(applying Central Hudson); Pac. Gas & Elec. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1
(1986) (same); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (same). As such, some of the
motivation underlying the leniency toward compelled commercial disclosures
established in Zauderer may or may not be withdrawn if the Court scraps the
distinction between commercial speech and fully protected speech.
110. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
111. Id. at 636.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 637–49.
114. See id. at 641, 647–48.
115. See id. at 650.
116. Id.
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flow of information to the public, disclosures are better understood as
requiring individuals to “provide somewhat more information than
they might otherwise be inclined to present.”117
The Court
acknowledged that First Amendment concerns arise any time a
regulation compels speech.118 The Court quickly distinguished the
laws at issue in Barnette, Wooley, and Tornillo from Ohio’s
disclosure requirement, however, because the Ohio disciplinary rule
only regulated commercial speech.119 Unlike the laws at issue in those
three previous decisions, Ohio had not attempted to prescribe
national, political, or religious orthodoxy; that is to say, the disclosure
did not infringe upon fully protected speech.120 Instead, the Court
stated, “The State has attempted only to prescribe what shall be
orthodox in commercial advertising, and its prescription has taken the
form of a requirement that appellant include in his advertising purely
factual and uncontroversial information about the terms under which
[the lawyer’s] services will be available.”121 When commercial speech
is at issue, the Court stated, any protection is justified principally by
the value to consumers of the information that such speech
provides.122 The commercial speaker’s “constitutionally protected
interest in not providing any particular factual information” is
minimal.123 Additionally, the Court stated that the use of disclosure
requirements, which “trench much more narrowly . . . than do flat
prohibitions” on the commercial speaker’s interests, further alleviates
First Amendment concerns.124
Having dispensed with the traditional First Amendment concerns
raised by laws that compel speech, the Court laid out a new test for
commercial disclosure requirements, a test less rigorous than either
Central Hudson or strict scrutiny.125 The Zauderer Court held “that
an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure
requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in
preventing deception of consumers.”126 Apart from asking only that
laws reasonably relate to the state interest, the Court in this new test
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 651.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 651–54.
Id. at 651.
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also refrained from engaging in a “strict ‘least restrictive’ means
analysis,” like the one prescribed by Central Hudson’s final step.127
The Court held that Ohio’s rule requiring attorneys to disclose
whether their advertised contingency rates include costs and expenses
easily met these new standards because the potential for deception
from advertisements lacking such a disclosure was self-evident.128
One can interpret Zauderer’s analysis as an alternative for
commercial speech that is inherently or potentially deceptive but not
unlawful or blatantly deceptive. Because such speech would fail (or
would come close enough to failing) the first step of the Central
Hudson analysis,129 the government is justified in imposing more
burdens on the speaker to offset the potential deception.130
A competing interpretation of the Court’s justification of the more
lenient analysis set forth in Zauderer is based on the minimal
protection afforded to commercial speakers. In contrast to laws
compelling fully protected speech, which are constitutionally
problematic primarily because of the affront to the individual forced
to spread an unwanted message, Zauderer might suggest that a
commercial speaker’s First Amendment interest in being free of
intrusions is relatively inconsequential and thus easily overridden.131
Therefore, the concerns that justify strict scrutiny when the
government compels fully protected speech are absent when the
government compels commercial speech. A lower standard of
scrutiny for such regulations is appropriate.
Although these views are not mutually exclusive, neither view gives
rise to the other. The two divergent interpretations are rooted in
distinct strands of reasoning that inform the Court’s decision in
Zauderer: first, that disclosure of “purely factual and
uncontroversial” information benefits consumers’ interests while only
minimally infringing on the commercial speaker’s interest; second,
that government should be granted broader discretion when it is
127. Id. at 651 n.14.
128. Id. at 652.
129. Recall that the first step in Central Hudson’s analysis asks whether the speech
is deceptive or unlawful. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980).
130. The Tenth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Wenger suggests this
interpretation. 427 F.3d 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
131. See Kathleen M. Sullivan & Robert C. Post, It’s What’s for Lunch: Nectarines,
Mushrooms, and Beef—The First Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech,
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 367–76 (2007) (arguing that Zauderer has created the
assumption that commercial speech is valued by the accuracy of information, not the
autonomy of commercial speakers).
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trying to prevent consumer deception particularly. Either of these
strands might independently motivate the more lenient standard set
forth in Zauderer.132 Parsing each of these distinctive textual origins
helps to recognize how different courts have come to broader or
narrower understandings about how to analyze compelled
commercial disclosures.
D. The Supreme Court and Disclosure Requirements Following

Zauderer
In the years since Zauderer, the Supreme Court has decided a
number of cases involving disclosure requirements. These cases help
define the limits of Zauderer, but like Zauderer itself they leave many
questions unsatisfactorily answered. Furthermore, some Justices’
statements indicate that fundamental presumptions of Zauderer are
not beyond reconsideration.
The first decision to consider a disclosure requirement postZauderer occurred in 1986 with Meese v. Keene.133 In Meese, the
Court rejected a challenge to a federal statute imposing disclosures on
films designated “political propaganda.”134 The statute required that
all films so designated carry a disclosure informing the recipient that
the film was registered with the Department of Justice and identifying
the distributor and the distributor’s principal.135 Although the
appellee, a California state senator who wished to exhibit Canadian
films about acid rain and nuclear war, primarily challenged the films’
“propaganda” designation,136 the Court cited the disclosure
requirement as a reason to uphold the statute.137 The Court found
that the disclosure requirement was a laudable alternative to
“prohibit[ing], edit[ing] or restrain[ing] the distribution of advocacy
materials in an ostensible effort to protect the public from conversion,
confusion, or deceit.”138 Echoing Zauderer’s reasoning, the Court
stated, “By compelling some disclosure of information and permitting
132. Logically, this also entails a third interpretation: that Zauderer established
two tests, one for regulations aimed to curb consumer deception and another for
disclosures of purely factual, uncontroversial information. Either of these two would
be sufficient to receive an exception to the Court’s presumption that compelled
speech is unconstitutional.
133. 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
134. Id. at 485.
135. Id. at 470–71.
136. Id. at 467–68.
137. Id. at 480–81.
138. Id. at 480.
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more, the Act’s approach recognizes that the best remedy for
misleading or inaccurate speech contained within materials subject to
the Act is fair, truthful, and accurate speech.”139
The Court’s reasoning in Meese paralleled its reasoning in
Zauderer. In both decisions, the Court found that disclosure
furthered the consumer or audience’s interest in access to more
information while minimally infringing on the speaker’s interest in
conveying her message.140 In both decisions, the Court accepted as
legitimate the government’s interest in preventing deception—or at
least potential deception.141 Nonetheless, the decision in Meese did
not invoke Zauderer; it did not even mention Zauderer.142
It is unclear how one should understand Meese’s failure to rely on
Zauderer. Unlike the commercial disclosure in Zauderer, the
disclosures in Meese were aimed at films designated as propaganda
and, thus, affected core political speech. In Meese, the state interest
was as much to prevent “conversion”143 as it was to prevent
deception.144 What, then, is the appropriate level of scrutiny in such
cases? Because the appellee challenged only the “propaganda”
designation, not the disclosure requirement, the Court did not
address what level of scrutiny applies to disclosures that implicate
fully protected speech. Nonetheless, Meese suggests that, even when
fully protected speech is at stake, the Court is categorically more
tolerant of disclosures than restrictions.145
In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina,
Inc., the Supreme Court considered a challenge to a North Carolina
statute governing the solicitation of charitable contributions by
professional fundraisers.146 One of the challenged provisions required
139. Id. at 481.
140. See supra notes 128–35 and accompanying text.
141. Meese begins to illustrate, however, how nebulous the notion of “aimed at
preventing deception” turns out to be. See supra notes 133–39 and accompanying
text.
142. See id.
143. “Conversion,” the Court’s term, although it does not necessarily denote a
listener risks being persuaded to a false belief, seems to connote that fundamental
beliefs are at stake and should these beliefs be expressed, it would constitute fully
protected speech. See supra note 138.
144. This language is reminiscent of regulations aimed at fostering national,
political, and religious orthodoxy which the Court has consistently struck down if
they restrict speech, like the law at issue in Wooley or Barnette. See supra note 65–74
and accompanying text.
145. If this is so, that also suggests that disclosures are a very specific and relatively
innocuous form of compelled speech.
146. 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988).
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professional fundraisers to disclose to potential donors what
percentage of contributions the represented charities actually
received.147 In contrast to the leniency that the Court afforded to
compelled disclosure in Meese, the Riley Court assessed the
disclosure requirement as stringently as it would restrictions placed
on fundraisers. The determinative inquiry, according to the Riley
majority, was not whether the statute required a factual disclosure,
but rather the nature of the speech at issue and the burden placed on
the compelled speaker.148 Compelled disclosures in the context of
fully protected, non-commercial speech would be analyzed as
rigorously as the regulations in Wooley or Tornillo.149
The Riley Court acknowledged that the facts of the case required it
to address how to classify speech when the speech’s commercial
aspects are “inextricably intertwined” with what would otherwise be
classified as fully protected speech.150 In such cases, the majority
stated, the courts are not to parse speech into its separate components
to assess each by a different standard.151 Instead, if a law affects core
protected speech, like when a law mandates that political fundraisers
disclose their gross percentages, courts should apply the standard
appropriate for fully protected speech—that is, in such cases, the
courts should apply strict scrutiny.152
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O’Connor, argued in
dissent that the statute was comparable to disclosures required in
securities transactions and merely required the disclosure of “relevant
and verifiable facts.”153 Rehnquist reasoned that the fundraising
disclosures were minimally burdensome and thus did not justify the
application of strict scrutiny.154 The Chief Justice believed that the
state’s interest in “better inform[ing] the donating public as to where
its money will go” was sufficiently strong.155 In many ways, the Chief
147. Id. at 795.
148. Id. at 796 (“Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a
compelled statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect
of the compelled statement thereon.”).
149. See id. 797–98 (“[Wooley and Tornillo] cannot be distinguished simply
because they involved compelled statements of opinion while here we deal with
compelled states of ‘fact’: either form of compulsion burdens protected speech.”).
150. Id. at 796.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 811.
154. See id.
155. Id. at 810 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 17, Riley v. Nat’l Fed. of the Blind
of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (No. 87-328)). The majority also sympathized with
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Justice’s dissent was consistent with the reasoning found in both
Zauderer and Meese. Like Zauderer and Reese, Rehnquist’s dissent
argued that factual disclosures constitute minimal infringements upon
a speaker’s First Amendment rights, and a sufficient state interest
easily outweighs these minimal infringements.
Rehnquist’s dissent did not invoke Zauderer for support. By
contrast, the majority rebutted the Chief Justice’s dissent by
specifically distinguishing the context at issue from the commercial
speech addressed in Zauderer.156 Riley set a clear wedge between the
tolerance the Court would grant compelled commercial disclosure
requirements and the lack of tolerance it would grant compelled
disclosure requirements implicating fully protected speech. “Purely
commercial speech,” the majority asserted, “is more susceptible to
compelled disclosure requirements.”157 Simply limiting a disclosure to
factual information, the Court stated, does not obviate its substantial
burden on protected speech.158
This conclusion answered the question that remained after Meese
as to which level of scrutiny should apply to disclosures that implicate
fully protected speech. It also created tension with that decision’s
loose and seemingly deferential analysis.159 The decision in Riley
starkly delineates one limit on Zauderer’s exception to compelled
speech jurisprudence.
Zauderer applies to purely commercial
compelled disclosure requirements. Riley also potentially calls into
question reasoning in Zauderer that found factual disclosure to be
minimally invasive, least restrictive means.
Like Zauderer, Ibanez v. Florida Department of Business &
Professional Regulation dealt with a mixture of restrictions and
disclosure requirements imposed by a state bar on lawyers’ ads.160
Unlike Zauderer, however, in Ibanez the Court failed to
systematically separate its analysis of the restrictions from its analysis
of the disclosure requirements. The disclosure at issue required
attorneys who cite a “specialist” accreditation in their advertisements
to disavow any state agency of that accreditation and disclose the

the state’s intention despite finding the disclosures unnecessary. See id. at 798
(“Although we do not wish to denigrate the State’s interest in full disclosure, the
danger the State posits is not as great as might initially appear.”).
156. See id. at 796 n.9.
157. Id.
158. See id. at 797–98.
159. See supra notes 145–47 and accompanying text.
160. 512 U.S. 136 (1994).
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relevant accrediting standards.161 The Court invalidated the rule
because the state failed to prove that the regulation addressed some
actual deception or confusion.162 Moreover, the Court hinted that the
disclosure requirement might have been unduly burdensome.163
Given the brevity of the Court’s analysis and the relative inattention
to Zauderer, Ibanez suggests only that when commercial speech is not
self-evidently deceptive or confusing, the government bears the
burden of establishing that the compelled disclosure rectifies some
non-hypothetical harm.164
The Supreme Court provided its most recent and, arguably, most
instructive analysis of a commercial disclosure requirement postZauderer in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz P.A. v. United States.165 In
Milavetz, a law firm challenged the application of Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 to attorneys.166
Among its complaints, the firm argued that provisions of the
Bankruptcy Abuse Act that required legal advertisements for
bankruptcy assistance to disclose information about the Act were
unconstitutional.167 The Milavetz Court rejected the firm’s contention
that Central Hudson should govern the Court’s analysis and, instead,
applied Zauderer.168 The Court gave two reasons for this. First, the
Court pointed out that the provision of the Bankruptcy Abuse Act in
question “is directed at misleading commercial speech.”169 Second,
the provision “impose[s] a disclosure requirement rather than an
affirmative limitation on speech.”170
The Court then offered a synopsis of Zauderer. The Court
reiterated, first, that the primary justification for First Amendment
protections for commercial speech lies in its value to consumers while
the commercial speaker’s interests are minimal; second, that
unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements would
161. Id. at 146.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 146–47.
164. But see Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio,
471 U.S. 626, 652–53 (1985) (“When the possibility of deception is as self-evident . . .
we need not require the State to ‘conduct a survey of the . . . public before it [may]
determine that the [advertisement] had a tendency to mislead.’” (quoting FTC v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 391–92 (1965))).
165. 559 U.S. 229 (2010).
166. Id. at 234.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 249.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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violate the First Amendment; and third, that commercial disclosure
requirements need only be reasonably related to a state’s interest in
preventing deception.171 Two important observations can be made
about the Court’s reconstruction of Zauderer. First, the Court seems
to have implied that any disclosure requirement that otherwise
conforms to the exception articulated in Zauderer is not “unjustified
or unduly burdensome.”172 The logic of Milavetz seems to suggest
that any disclosure requirement that is reasonably related to the
government’s interest in preventing consumer deception is, by that
very fact, never unduly burdensome.173 Second, Milavetz, like
Zauderer before it, confined itself to disclosures aimed at rectifying
potentially misleading advertising. Nonetheless, the Court removed
the state’s burden of proving that the commercial speech has a
tendency to mislead when the possibility of deception is selfevident.174 Still, whether the Court would allow state interests other
than preventing consumer deception to garner Zauderer’s lenient
scrutiny remained an unanswered question.
In Milavetz, Justice Thomas concurred to express his willingness to
“reexamine Zauderer and its progeny in an appropriate case to
determine whether these precedents provide sufficient First
Amendment protection against government-mandated disclosures.”175
Thomas asserted his belief that the First Amendment did not support
lowered scrutiny for any regulation of commercial speech, compelled
disclosures or restrictions alike.176 Further, he noted that the
distinction between compelling speech and restricting speech had no
constitutional significance when it came to protected speech.177
Although Thomas ultimately concurred in judgment, his concurrence

171. Id. at 249–50.
172. See id. (“Unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements offend
the First Amendment by chilling protected speech, but ‘an advertiser’s rights are
adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the
State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers.’” (quoting Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))).
173. This construction is not unique to Milavetz. In fact, it is also present in
Zauderer, but the Court in Zauderer also suggested it is not willing to do a “strict”
least restrictive means analysis, leaving open the possibility that some “less than
strict” least restrictive means analysis might at times be appropriate even under
Zauderer. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 & n.14.
174. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251.
175. Id. at 256 (Thomas, J., concurring).
176. Id. at 255.
177. Id. at 255 (citing Riley v. Nat’l Fed. Of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781,
796–97 (1988)).
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nevertheless signaled pressure to further contract or eliminate
Zauderer.178
The decisions in Meese, Riley, Ibanez, and Milavetz clarified the
application of Zauderer’s exception to compelled speech doctrine,
but major uncertainties persist. Meese and Riley suggested that
Zauderer is limited to commercial speech; Riley limited it to purely
commercial speech. Furthermore, the absence of any cases applying
Zauderer when the state’s purpose was not to prevent consumer
deception suggests—although inconclusively—that the Supreme
Court confines Zauderer to compelled disclosure requirements that
address potentially deceptive commercial speech.
II. TOBACCO WARNINGS AND THE ISSUE OF INTERPRETING

ZAUDERER
A. Conservative or Liberal Zauderer 179
Many uncertainties persist about how to apply the Supreme
Court’s reasoning in Zauderer. The primary question that the courts
have grappled with is whether Zauderer’s exception should be limited
to disclosures preventing consumer deception.
Commercial
disclosures have become ubiquitous. Scholars emphasize the extent
to which Congress, executive agencies, state legislatures, and
municipalities rely on disclosure requirements to achieve a wide
range of objectives.180 In many cases their goal is not strictly to
prevent consumer deception. Disclosures are used also to increase
consumers’ access to information to aid in their decision-making,
even when there is no potential for deception.181 In some instances,
178. Justice Thomas dissented in Citizens United v. FEC, arguing that the
disclosure at issue should be invalidated and that limiting individuals to an “as
applied” challenge insufficiently vindicated speech rights. 558 U.S. 310, 480 (2010)
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Underlying Justice Thomas’s
position was the belief that disclaimers and disclosures, like restrictions, have a
chilling effect and impose unconstitutional limitations on a speaker’s rights. See id.
179. See infra notes 129–32 and accompanying text.
180. See Leslie Gielow Jacobs, What the Abortion Disclosure Cases Say About the
Constitutionality of Persuasive Government Speech on Product Labels, 87 DENV. U.
L. REV. 855, 859 (2010); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient Markets: Compelled
Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods,
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 562–63 (2006).
181. In the context of securities disclosure requirements Post calls this the goal of
“promot[ing] transparent and efficient markets,” but generally it refers to disclosures
of any sort that aim to provide consumers with accurate information to allow
consumers to assess a product or service’s true value. See Post, supra note 180, at
562–63.
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the goal is a paternalistic attempt to change consumer behavior to
effectuate some further state interest like public health or safety.182
This raises the question of whether compelled commercial disclosures
like nutrition labels should be subjected to Zauderer’s lenient
scrutiny even though consumers likely are not deceived, for instance,
that a bag of chocolate chip cookies has more sugar, calories,
carbohydrates, and less Vitamin A than a bag of baby carrots.183
While much of the disagreement between courts about the limits of
Zauderer centers on the question of which government interests can
justify compelled commercial disclosures, this is not the only open
question. A second question concerns how to understand the phrase
“purely factual and uncontroversial” and incorporate it into
Zauderer’s analysis.184 These two interpretative questions are
independent. While disclosing purely factual information can achieve
paternalistic goals, these goals also might be achieved more
effectively by compelling disclosure of information that is not strictly
factual or uncontroversial. How far a court is willing to extend the
category of what constitutes a purely factual disclosure need not
depend on whether the court limits Zauderer’s analysis to disclosures
aimed at preventing consumer deception.
A third question, not entirely clarified in either Zauderer or
Milavetz, is how courts should assess relative burdens that the
disclosure requirement imposes. Not only do both decisions suggest

182. Gielow Jacobs discusses what she labels “paternalistic” state interests in which
the government regulates speech to effect changes in commercial transactions to
achieve some public good. See Gielow Jacobs, supra note 180, at 879–80. Cigarette
warning labels seem to provide a classic example of this sort of regulation. Id. at 880.
But see Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 23, R.J.
Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 18 (arguing
that the primary goal of the new cigarette warnings qualifies as preventing confusion
or deception).
183. Circuits have taken opposing positions on this issue. The First Circuit, for
instance, explicitly rejected the view that Zauderer’s analysis should be limited to
disclosure aimed at preventing deception. See Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe,
429 F.3d 294, 310, 310 n.8 (1st Cir. 2005). The Seventh Circuit, by contrast, has stated
it would confine the application of Zauderer’s analysis to disclosure requirements
aimed at preventing deception. See Commodity Trend Serv., Inc. v. CFTC, 233 F.3d
981, 995 (7th Cir. 2000).
184. Compare Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th
Cir. 2006) (finding Zauderer inapplicable because the disclosed material constituted a
subjective, highly controversial opinion), with Video Software Dealers Ass’n v.
Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966–67 (2009), aff’d sub nom. Brown v. Entm’t
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (finding a disclosure requirement
unconstitutional under Zauderer’s analysis because the disclosure failed to convey
factual information).
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that disclosure requirements are categorically less restrictive than
other forms of regulation,185 language in both decisions also suggests
that when a disclosure requirement is reasonably related to
preventing consumer deception, courts need not inquire if it is unduly
burdensome.186 Still, some courts have read Zauderer to prescribe an
assessment of burdens imposed by disclosure requirements.187
These three questions—the role of burdens imposed by disclosures,
which state interests justify disclosure, and what “purely factual”
means—are internal interpretative questions.188 Courts seeking to
apply Zauderer also face external interpretative questions,
specifically the question of how to situate the Zauderer decision into
broader First Amendment jurisprudence. Conceptually speaking, this
question requires a court to determine if Zauderer is an exception to
the Supreme Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence, an offshoot of
its commercial speech jurisprudence, or if it resides at a crossroads
between the two doctrines.189 Practically speaking, how a court
addresses that question will determine which test the court should
apply if it finds Zauderer inapplicable. A court might view Zauderer
as providing a limited exception to strictness with which it would
otherwise assess laws attempting to compel speech, or a court might
view Zauderer as a further loosening of the already relaxed scrutiny it
applies to regulations of commercial speech.190
Because Zauderer leaves many independent, open questions it may
not be useful to categorize the various interpretations along a linear
spectrum of broad to narrow depending on how any one question is

185. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 650 (1985).
186. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
187. See e.g., Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641 (7th Cir. 2006).
188. By “internal interpretive questions,” this Note refers to questions regarding
the proper application of the analysis articulated in Zauderer.
189. Compare Blagojevich, 469 F.3d at 652 (aligning Zauderer’s analysis with
compelled speech jurisprudence), with United States v. Wenger, 427 F.3d 840, 849
(10th Cir. 2005) (describing Zauderer’s analysis as a modification of Central
Hudson’s analysis).
190. This difference is not purely academic. The arguments that the parties made
in R.J. Reynolds illustrate what is at stake. In its brief, the FDA urged the district
court to apply Central Hudson if it found Zauderer inapplicable. See Defendant’s
Opposition to Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 15, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No.
11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2011), ECF No. 18. On the other hand, the tobacco
companies urged the district court to find Zauderer inapplicable and, subsequently,
apply strict scrutiny. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent
Injunction at 29, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-1482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011),
ECF No. 10.
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answered.191 Instead, by considering the effect that implementing a
particular interpretation will have on the “vast regulatory apparatus
. . . erected on the foundation of Zauderer,”192 different approaches
can be categorized as more liberal and more conservative.193 A liberal
interpretation allowing government greater license under the First
Amendment to compel commercial disclosures would not undermine
this vast regulatory regime. A more conservative interpretation using
the First Amendment to more narrowly circumscribe the range of
permissible compelled commercial disclosures would scale back the
vast regime. The new graphic cigarette warning labels perfectly
illustrate the alternative approaches. The more conservatively a court
confines the scope of Zauderer’s exception, the more likely it is that
the court will strike down the FDA’s new graphic warning labels as
unconstitutional compelled speech. The more liberally a court
interprets Zauderer, the more likely the warnings will stand.
B.

Litigation Over the Tobacco Control Act’s Cigarette
Warning Labels

1.

Discount Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States

On August 31, 2009, shortly after the enactment of the Tobacco
Control Act, five tobacco companies and a tobacco retailer filed suit
in the Western District of Kentucky.194 In the resulting litigation,
Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, the companies
challenged each provision of the Act that implicated the First
Amendment.195 The court ultimately enjoined enforcement of two
provisions: a ban on color graphics in tobacco advertisements and a
ban on claims implying tobacco products are safer as a result of FDA
regulation.196 The district court concluded that every other provision
191. Jacobs employs the “narrow” and “broad” terminology and focuses primarily
on the which state purposes are acceptable under Zauderer. See Gielow Jacobs,
supra note 180, at 863.
192. Post, supra note 180, at 562 (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits,
Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of 44 Liquormart, 1996 SUP. CT. REV.
123, 156 (1996)). For an example of a regulation qualifying as part of this vast
regulatory apparatus, see the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act codified at 21
C.F.R. § 101.1, which provides the guidelines for nutritional warning labels on food.
193. These terms are used without referring to political or ideological
connotations.
194. Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512 (W.D. Ky.
2010).
195. Id. at 519.
196. Id. at 541.

STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1228

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

[Vol. XL

withstood the tobacco companies’ challenge, including the provision
requiring the cigarette packs to display the new graphic warning
labels.197
The district court’s discussion of the graphic cigarette warning
labels is notable for two reasons. First, it failed to distinguish
between restrictions on speech and compulsions of speech.198 The
Commonwealth Brands court applied Central Hudson’s four-step
analysis to the provisions of the Act restricting tobacco advertising as
well as to the inchoate cigarette label warnings.199 Second, the FDA
had not promulgated the final version of the graphics by the time the
case was decided. The court stated, nonetheless, that it did not
believe “the addition of a graphic image [would] alter the substance
of [the government’s] message[], at least as a general rule.”200
Both the tobacco companies and the United States appealed the
Western District of Kentucky’s decision, and on March 19, 2012, the
Sixth Circuit issued its opinion in the case, recaptioned as Discount
Tobacco City & Lottery Inc. v. United States.201 With the exception
of the graphic warning labels, the panel agreed on the
constitutionality of each challenged provision of the Tobacco Control
Act.202 Judge Eric L. Clay, who authored the otherwise unanimous
opinion, split with his fellow judges on the graphic warning labels’
constitutionality. He dissented, arguing that the graphic aspects of
the warning labels violated the First Amendment.203 The other
judges, Judge Jane B. Stranch joined by Judge Michael R. Barrett,
upheld the constitutionality of the graphic warning label provision of
the Tobacco Control Act.204

197. Id.
198. See id. at 528–32.
199. See id. at 532 (“[T]he Court finds that the warning requirement is sufficiently
tailored to advance the government’s substantial interest under Central Hudson.”).
200. Id.
201. 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir. 2012).
202. See id. at 524–31. In all, the unanimous majority affirmed the district court
rulings that upheld the Act’s restrictions on the marketing of modified-risk tobacco
products, the ban on tobacco company event sponsorship, and the ban on tobacco
branding on non-tobacco merchandise, the ban on free sampling. Next, the
unanimous majority affirmed the district court’s determination that restricting
tobacco companies to black and white advertising violated the First Amendment.
Finally, the unanimous majority reversed the court below and upheld the provision of
the Tobacco Control Act restricting tobacco companies’ ability to imply that FDA
regulation renders tobacco products safer. See id. at 518.
203. See id at 524–31; see also supra notes 15–20 and accompanying text.
204. See id. at 551–69.
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At the outset, the majority emphasized that it would construe the
tobacco companies’ challenge facially, rather than as-applied.205 This
meant the court would consider the constitutionality of the provision
generally; it would not analyze the nine images published in the
FDA’s June 2011 Final Rule.206 For the tobacco companies’ facial
challenge to succeed, they would have to convince the court that the
underlying provision of the Tobacco Control Act offended the First
Amendment regardless of which images the FDA ultimately
published.207 The Discount Tobacco City court cited four reasons for
restraining itself to a facial assessment of the act’s warning label
provision. First, the court refused to assess any specific image
because the FDA published the Final Rule only one month prior to
oral arguments and the selected warnings would not appear until well
after arguments.208 Second, there could be no appellate review of any
specific images because, according to the majority, the district court
had not ruled on any specific images.209 Third, the majority
emphasized that the tobacco companies’ own litigation strategy
sought to independently challenge the finalized warning labels in a
separate suit, namely R.J. Reynolds v. FDA.210 Finally, granting the
relief that the tobacco companies requested—striking down the
warning labels for all tobacco producers and sellers, not merely the
parties before the court—required the court to issue a facial ruling on
the challenged legislation.211 According to the majority, “Addressing
the specific images would require us to reach a constitutional question
that was neither briefed nor argued and turns on facts not available,
litigated, or considered by the district court, all of which would fly in
the face of the restraint we should exercise during judicial review.”212

205. See id. at 552.
206. See id.
207. See id. at 554 (“To succeed in a typical facial attack, [a plaintiff] would have to
establish that no set of circumstances exists under which [the statute] would be valid,
or that the statute lacks any plainly legitimate sweep.” (quoting United States v.
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1557, 1587 (2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
208. See id. at 552–53. The Sixth Circuit heard oral arguments on July 27, 2011.
The FDA published its Final Rule on June 22, 2011. Id. The Final Rule was set to
take effect on September 22, 2011. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
209. See id. at 553 (parsing the district court’s language to determine that the court
below had considered the provision generally).
210. See id. at 553–54 (noting that tobacco companies’ complaint in R.J. Reynolds
characterized the Discount Tobacco City litigation as a facial challenge, and asserting
that “[l]itigation strategy is unquestionably the domain of Plaintiffs”).
211. See id. at 554 (citing John Doe #1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010)).
212. Id. at 553.
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The Discount Tobacco City court next considered the appropriate
level of scrutiny for analyzing compelled commercial disclosures.213
The majority suggested two options. First, if a commercial disclosure
requirement meets the conditions outlined in Zauderer, it garners a
Alternatively, if a disclosure
lenient rational basis review.214
requirement fails to satisfy the conditions in Zauderer, courts should
treat it like any other law compelling speech and apply strict
scrutiny.215 The Discount Tobacco City majority, therefore, sided
with the Seventh Circuit and posited that within the wider realm of
First Amendment jurisprudence, Zauderer’s analysis provides an
exception to the stringent scrutiny typically applied to laws that
compel speech.216
Two cases, the Supreme Court’s decision in Milavetz217 and the
Second Circuit’s decision in National Electrical Manufacturers
Association v. Sorrell,218 highlighted for the majority just how
leniently disclosure requirements should be assessed when a
disclosure requirement meets Zauderer’s triggering conditions.219
These cases emphasized three important considerations. First, they
demonstrated that the government does not need to prove that the
disclosure will fulfill its intended aim effectively in all or even most
circumstances.220 Rather, the government must only prove as a matter
of common sense that the disclosure will advance the state’s
purported interest and any effect toward that end, however slight, will
suffice.221 Moreover, no more proof of the disclosure’s effectiveness is

213. See id. at 554.
214. Id.
215. Id. (citing Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 651–52 (7th
Cir. 2006)).
216. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
218. 272 F.3d 104, 113–16 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying Zauderer to disclosure
requirements for products containing mercury).
219. See, e.g., Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 556–57 (“The Second Circuit
case of [Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n] reinforces the principles . . . that deciding whether
the required disclosure satisfies the reasonably related requirement is all that is
necessary to determine the disclosure’s constitutionality, and . . . that satisfying this
requirement is a simple task.”).
220. See id. at 557–58; see also id. at 564 (noting with approval that the Nat’l Elec.
Mfrs. Ass’n court found that a common sense determination that commerce might
change their behavior sufficiently satisfied Zauderer’s scrutiny).
221. See id. at 557 (“[The] constitutionality [of a disclosure requirement] does not
hinge upon some quantum of proof that a disclosure will realize the underlying
purpose. A common sense analysis will do. And the disclosure has to advance the
purpose only slightly.” (citing Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n, 272 F.3d at 115)).
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necessary.222 When the aim is to prevent consumer deception,
disclosures need only provide information that some consumers find
pertinent when deciding whether to purchase goods or procure
services.223
Extrapolating from the reasoning in these earlier
decisions, the Discount Tobacco City majority posited a very liberal
interpretation of the “reasonably related” component of Zauderer’s
analysis, one highly deferential to a government’s intended purpose.
Second, for Discount Tobacco City all factual disclosures fall
within the ambit of Zauderer’s analysis.224 National Electrical
Manufacturers Association particularly reinforced for the Discount
Tobacco City majority that the critical factor in deciding whether to
apply Zauderer’s rational basis review is whether the disclosure
requirement compels factual information or opinion.225
Thus,
Zauderer’s “purely factual and uncontroversial” component functions
as a triggering condition for its rational basis review. Moreover, the
Discount Tobacco City court consciously simplified “purely factual
and uncontroversial” to a question of whether the disclosure reveals
factual information.226 As long as the disclosed information is factual,
the disclosure requirement garners the Zauderer’s lenient rational
basis review. If the condition is not satisfied, Zauderer requires that

222. See id.
223. See id. at 556 (noting that the Milavetz Court found disclosures constitutional
because they revealed facts pertinent to consumer decision-making); see also id. at
564 (“In concluding that it was probable that some consumers would change their
behavior in response to disclosures, [National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n] did not point to any
evidence showing that some consumers would change; instead, it reasonably assumed
they would based on common sense. That sufficed.” (citations omitted)).
224. See id. at 555 (“Zauderer relied on the distinction between a fact and a
personal or political opinion to distinguish factual, commercial-speech disclosure
requirements, to which courts apply a rational-basis rule, from the type of compelled
speech on matters of opinion that is ‘as violative of the First Amendment as
prohibitions on speech.’” (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650)).
225. See id. at 556 (“[Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n] reinforces the principle[] that
distinguishing between a fact and a personal or political opinion controls whether a
required rule is reviewed under Zauderer’s rational-basis rule or the more exacting
compelled speech doctrine.”).
226. Responding to the tobacco companies’ argument that Zauderer requires
disclosures to be “purely factual and noncontroversial,” the majority disagreed,
claiming that any such language in Zauderer described the disclosure at issue but did
not proscribe a general standard to trigger the rational basis analysis. See id. at 559
n.8. The majority went on to argue that because the phrase never appears in
Milavetz, the Supreme never intended to proscribe a triggering standard as robust as
“purely factual and uncontroversial,” but rather factual or accurate disclosure would
suffice. Id.
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courts, instead, strictly scrutinize the requirement as they would other
forms of compelled speech.227
Third, according to the majority, once a court determines that a
disclosure falls within Zauderer’s ambit, rational basis review is the
sole inquiry.228 According to the majority, Milavetz and National
Electrical Manufacturers conclusively confirmed that Zauderer did
not direct courts to weigh the burdens imposed by disclosure.229 As
long as the disclosure is reasonably related to the state’s goal, any
burdens on the speaker that disclosure imposes are irrelevant to the
disclosure requirement’s constitutionality.230 As such, the Discount
Tobacco City court refused to address whether the size of tobacco
warning labels and the ratio of the package covered by them unduly
burdened cigarette companies’ own commercial speech.231
Once it had articulated its interpretation of Zauderer, the Discount
Tobacco City court’s task became a two-step process.232 First, the
court determined whether the graphic warning label provision of the
Tobacco Control Act satisfied Zauderer’s triggering condition—that
is, whether it required a disclosure of facts. Second, if so, the court
would apply rational basis review to the constitutionality of the
warning label provision.233
The court first distinguished the textual content of the warning
labels from their graphic content. It then proceeded to determine
whether both the textual content and graphic content were properly

227. See id. at 554. The majority cited Blagojevich for the proposition that the
alternative to Zauderer’s analysis is strict scrutiny. See supra note 202 and
accompanying text. In fact, the Discount Tobacco City majority distinguished the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Blagojevich by emphasizing that the disclosures at issue
in that case were as a matter of law nonfactual, subjective opinions. They therefore
triggered strict scrutiny. Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d 561.
228. Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 567 (“Deciding whether a disclosure
requirement is reasonably related to the purpose is all the law requires to assess
constitutionality.”).
229. See id. at 556 (“Significantly, the [Milavetz] Court upheld the required
disclosures without separately analyzing whether they were unjustified or unduly
burdensome.”).
230. The majority read the failure of the Milavetz Court to conduct an “undue
burdens” inquiry as decisive proof that the Supreme Court never intended such an
inquiry to be part of Zauderer’s analysis. See id. at 555–56.
231. See id. at 567 (“Again, to the extent that [the tobacco companies] argue that
we must separately analyze whether the warnings are unduly burdensome, they are
mistaken.”).
232. See id. at 558–61.
233. The majority found Zauderer’s analysis applicable. See supra note 202 and
accompanying text.
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factual and thus warranted rational basis review.234 The textual
content of warning labels, the majority stated, is undisputedly factual:
“It is beyond cavil that smoking presents health risks described in the
warnings, and [tobacco companies] do not contend otherwise.”235 The
court summarily concluded that the textual aspect of the warning
labels fell within purview Zauderer’s analysis.236
The majority more thoroughly evaluated the graphic content
required by the warning label provision,237 but did so without
reference to the content in any specific image published in the FDA’s
Final Rule.238 The Tobacco Control Act’s graphic warning label
provision would stand or fall on its own merits. Because the Discount
Tobacco City court would not evaluate the content of specific images,
the court assessed, generally, whether images could convey factual
information and, in particular, whether images could factually convey
the negative health consequences of smoking.239 The court noted just
how untenable a facial challenge made the tobacco companies’
position.240
Essentially, to withhold rational basis review, the
companies would need to convince the court that images categorically
could not convey factual information, a position the court described
as “stand[ing] at odds with reason.”241 The majority proceeded to
enumerate its own non-exhaustive list of imagery capable of factually
conveying the negative health consequences of smoking.242 Some
234. Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 558.
235. Id.
236. See id.
237. See id. at 559–61.
238. See id. at 558 (“The Act’s graphic-warnings provision mandates that the FDA
‘require color graphics depicting the negative health consequences of smoking’ to
accompany the textual warnings on cigarette packaging and advertising. Because
[the tobacco companies] bring a facial challenge to the warning label requirements,
our concern is not with the specific images the FDA chose . . . .” (citations omitted)).
239. The court never expressly delineates these two distinct questions, at times
addressing whether images could be factual and at other times addressing the
possibility of finding images that could convey factual information about the negative
health consequences of smoking. Compare id. at 560 (“Zauderer itself eviscerates the
argument that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate or factual.”), with id. at 559
(“Students in biology, human-anatomy, and medical-school courses look at pictures
or drawings in textbooks . . . because these pictures convey factual information about
medical conditions and biological systems.”).
240. See id. at 559.
241. See id.
242. “A nonexhaustive list of some that [sic] would include a picture or drawing of
a nonsmoker’s and a smoker’s lungs displayed side by side; a picture of a doctor
looking at an x-ray of either a smoker’s cancerous lungs or some other part of the
body presenting a smoking related condition . . . .” Id. at 559.

STRAUB_CHRISTENSEN (DO NOT DELETE)

1234

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

6/26/2013 8:39 PM

[Vol. XL

images described in the majority’s list of potential, factual images
were indistinguishable from images the FDA finally selected.243
Given the majority’s reasoning, this list of potential, factual images
alone sufficed to justify a rational basis review of graphic content of
the warning labels as prescribed by the act. The Discount Tobacco
City court, nevertheless, hammered its conclusion home. First, the
mere fact that images are representational does not preclude their
being factual; for instance, illustrations in medical textbooks
pictorially depict factual information about medical conditions.244
Moreover, textual depictions of illness and disease could be equally
representational.245
Second, the Supreme Court recognized in
Zauderer itself that illustrations can convey information factually and
accurately.246 The majority cited the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Zauderer to imply that the use of images for their emotional
resonance and their ability to attract attention is not illegitimate, nor
does it render those images nonfactual.247 Convinced that images
243. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
244. Id. (“And yet medical students learn valuable factual information in part by
examining pictures and images of the human body and the various illnesses that may
befall it. So arguing that representation of a medical condition becomes an opinion
when people could have that medical condition in ways that deviate from the
representation would lead to an unsupportable conclusion that textual or pictorial
descriptions of standard medical conditions must be opinions as well.” (emphasis
added)).
245. See id.
246. See id. at 560. Elsewhere in Zauderer the Court addressed a restriction on the
plaintiff attorney’s use of illustrations in his advertisements. See Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647–49 (1985).
247. See Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 560 (accusing the dissent of adopting
the position the Supreme Court rejected in Zauderer that illustrations pose a threat
because they create an unacceptable risk of consumer deception, manipulation, and
confusion). According to the majority, Zauderer foreclosed the argument that the
ability of pictures to grab attention and evoke emotion renders them nonfactual. The
Supreme Court found that the images in question, an illustration of an IUD in the
plaintiff’s ads, “serv[ed] and important communicative function: it attract[ed] the
attention of the audience to the advertiser’s message.” See id. (quoting Zauderer, 471
U.S. at 647) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court also found,
however, that the same image, the illustration of the IUD, was an accurate
representation. See id. (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647–49). Thus, in the Supreme
Court’s estimation the dual benefits of images—that they attract attention and evoke
emotion—do not thereby preclude their factuality.
On the issue of whether images’ ability to trigger visceral reactions and spark
controversy violated Zauderer’s framework for compelled commercial disclosures,
the Discount Tobacco City majority expressed their disagreement with both their
own dissent and the D.C. District Court’s opinion in the R.J. Reynolds litigation. See
id. at 569 n.17. This seems to be the one instance in which the Discount Tobacco City
majority broke restraint and commented on the merits of the R.J. Reynolds litigation.
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could be factual, the majority found that “there is no reason why a
picture could not accurately represent a negative health consequence
of smoking, such as a cancerous lung.”248 According to the majority,
therefore, the graphic aspects of the Tobacco Control Act’s warning
label provision qualified for rational basis review under Zauderer.249
Once it had determined that the graphic content in the Tobacco
Control Act’s warning label provision triggered Zauderer’s analysis,
the Discount Tobacco City court proceeded to the second stage of its
inquiry: evaluating whether the warning labels reasonably related to
government’s goal.250 The majority stated, “The Act’s required
textual and graphic warnings are constitutional if there is a rational
connection between the warnings’ purpose and the means used to
achieve that purpose.”251 Here, the government’s interest was to
prevent consumer deception on the negative health consequences of
smoking through use of warnings that promoted a greater
understanding of smoking’s true health risks.252 The court—perhaps
uncomfortable with labeling current tobacco products or advertising
as inherently or self-evidently deceptive—stated that, “The genesis of
the [government’s] stated purpose is self evident.
Tobacco
manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations . . . knowingly
and actively conspired to deceive the public about the health risks
and addictiveness of smoking for decades.”253 As such, the Discount
Tobacco City court found it unnecessary to find that tobacco products
(or tobacco marketing) were self-evidently deceptive; the court,
instead, could rely on prior case law attesting to systematic, industryStill, the majority refused to address whether FDA’s finalized graphics were
nonfactual because they had been selected for their emotional resonance and
persuasive ability. See id. at 560 n.9 (rebuking the dissent for addressing the visceral
reaction created by the FDA’s finalized warning labels).
248. Id. at 560.
249. See id. at 561.
250. See id. (evaluating the Tobacco Control Act’s disclosure provision under the
rational basis test).
251. Id. Earlier, the majority clarified its view that Zauderer did not mandate that
the government aim narrowly at preventing consumer deception “per se.” See id. at
557 (recounting the fact that the government’s aim in National Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n was
not to prevent consumer deception). Moreover, nothing in the majority’s opinion
suggests that Zauderer imposes any limitation on the government’s use of disclosures
for purposes beyond preventing consumer deception. It was unnecessary, however,
for the majority to opine expressly about which goals legitimately fall within the
purview of Zauderer’s analysis, because, as the court characterized it, the purpose of
the tobacco warning labels is in fact to prevent the consumer from being misled about
the health affects of tobacco.
252. Id. at 561.
253. Id. at 562.
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wide deceptive practices by tobacco companies in the sale and
marketing of their products.254 This case law also established
substantial ignorance about the dangers of smoking, particularly
among young people.255 The Discount Tobacco City majority found
the current black and white textual warning labels to be an
inadequate response to this history of deception: the current warnings
were too inconspicuous to capture consumers’ attention,256 and they
were written at a reading level too advanced for the average tobacco
consumer.257 It is no surprise, the court stated, that the average
smoker failed to understand the true health consequences of smoking:
“A warning that is not noticed, read, or understood by consumers
does not serve its function.”258 The Tobacco Control Act’s graphic
warning labels, the court stated, remedy these deficiencies because
they are larger and include graphics.259 For the Discount Tobacco
City majority, the probability that the new warning labels would be
proven more effective than the old labels sufficed to render the new
warning labels constitutional under Zauderer’s rational basis test.260
Yet the court did not rest on its own common sense assessment of the
warning labels’ efficacy, but rather on “abundant evidence
establish[ing] that larger warnings incorporating graphics promote
greater understanding of tobacco-related health risks and materially
affect consumers’ decisions regarding tobacco use.”261 The court cited
multiple studies that indicated benefits in other countries—including
Canada, Australia, and Thailand—had been achieved by

254. See id. at 562–63 (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp. Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992);
United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per
curiam)).
255. See id. at 564 (“[R]esearch and expert testimony demonstrate that most youth
. . . have a very inadequate understanding of the medical consequences, physical pain,
and emotional suffering which results from smoking and the unlikelihood of their
being able to quit at some future time.” (quoting United States v. Phillip Morris, 449
F. Supp. 2d 1, 579–80 (D.D.C. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
256. Id. at 563.
257. See id. (“The [current] warnings ‘require a college reading level’ and thus
‘may be inappropriate for youth and Americans with poor reading abilities’ and low
levels of education.” (quoting INST. OF MED., ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION, at C-3 (2007))).
258. Id. at 564.
259. Id. at 565.
260. See id. at 564 (reiterating that, pursuant to the reasoning in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs.
Ass’n, all that Zauderer’s rational basis review requires is a likelihood that the
disclosures affect some consumer behavior).
261. Id. at 565.
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implementing similar warnings.262 As such, the majority held “[t]he
warnings are reasonably related to the purpose Congress sought to
achieve—namely preventing consumer deception—and are therefore
constitutional.”263
In the end, the Discount Tobacco City majority interpreted
Zauderer’s analysis to impose a low constitutional hurdle for
compelled commercial disclosures. Several aspects of the court’s
reasoning demonstrate this conclusion. First, the court insisted that
Zauderer’s analysis did not include any inquiry into the burdens
imposed by disclosure as long as the triggering condition for
Zauderer’s analysis was met.264 Second, the court distilled the
triggering condition for Zauderer’s rational basis review into a
showing of mere factuality and discarded the language from Zauderer
that suggested commercial disclosures must be purely factual and
noncontroversial.265 Third, the court did not require that the
commercial speech in question, here the cigarette packages and
advertising, be self-evidently misleading. It sufficed that (i) there had
been prior deceptive practice by the tobacco companies and (ii) those
prior deceptive practices contributed to consumer ignorance.266
Fourth, the court seemed to be the first of Zauderer’s progeny to base
the constitutionality of a disclosure requirement in part on the fact
that the disclosure more effectively advanced the government’s goal
than had prior (and less burdensome) alternatives.267 Fifth, for the
majority, Zauderer’s rational basis review could be satisfied even if
the new warnings did not actually change consumer behavior or
successfully combat consumer deception.268
For the majority,
Zauderer’s analysis simply required the graphic warning labels to
disclose information pertinent to some consumers’ decision whether
to purchase tobacco.
Ultimately, the Discount Tobacco City
majority’s reasoning implies a highly permissive interpretation of
Zauderer’s analysis for compelled commercial disclosures. As such,
the decision falls on the far liberal end of the spectrum of how to
interpret Zauderer.

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.

See id. at 565–66.
Id. at 566.
See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 227–30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 227–29 and accompanying text.
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The Discount Tobacco City Dissent

Judge Eric L. Clay dissented solely on the issue of the graphic
warning labels.269 For Clay, all laws implicating commercial speech
are subject to the framework outlined in one of two cases: either
Central Hudson or Zauderer.270 According to Clay, the decision of
which of those two frameworks to apply rests entirely upon the
outcome of the first step in Central Hudson’s four-step analysis,
regardless of whether the law restricts speech or compels it.271 When
the government restricts commercial speech that is neither misleading
nor unlawful, a court should proceed through the remaining steps in
Central Hudson’s analysis to determine the law’s constitutionality.272
But when commercial speech is misleading or at least potentially
misleading, the law’s constitutionality falls within Zauderer’s ambit.273
Clay seems to hold the view, which other judges on the panel
criticized,274 that Zauderer’s exception is not relegated to compelled
commercial speech, but includes restrictions on commercial speech as
well.275 Rather, Zauderer, for Clay, provides an alternative level of
scrutiny for commercial speech unworthy of the protection that
Central Hudson’s framework affords because “untruthful speech,
commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake.”276

269. See Discount Tobacco City Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 527–30 (6th
Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting).
270. See id. at 522 (“We review the Act’s restrictions on commercial speech,
subject to the framework initially set forth in [Central Hudson] and [Zauderer].”
(citations omitted)). Clay, despite urging from the tobacco companies to apply strict
scrutiny to all provisions of the Tobacco Control Act, declined to outpace the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on commercial speech. See id.
271. See id. at 522–24 (differentiating the application of Central Hudson’s and
Zauderer’s analyses on whether the commercial speech implicated is misleading).
272. See id. at 522–23.
273. “Because the Central Hudson test does not govern commercial speech that is
false, deceptive or misleading, if commercial speech is so categorized, we apply a
different test to determine whether a restriction, or a disclosure requirement is
unconstitutional.” Id. at 523.
274. Id. at 551–52 (Stranch, J., majority opinion).
275. See id. at 523. In support of his interpretation, Clay cites Justice Breyer’s
dissenting opinion in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., in which Breyer states that
misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales tactics lack even the intermediate
protection of Central Hudson’s standard. See id. (citing Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
276. Id. at 523 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 (1976)).
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Clay singled out the warnings’ imagery as the sole component of
the warning labels to offend the First Amendment.277 According to
Clay, the images were subjective and the “inherently persuasive
character of the visual medium[] cannot be presumed neutral.”278
Clay acknowledged that the failure of consumers to appreciate the
negative health consequences of smoking creates “an information
deficit . . . which may render warningless tobacco products inherently
deceptive.”279 He similarly recognized the inadequacies of the current
warning labels.280 The government, however, had not established that
the color graphics—given Clay’s view of their subjectivity—were a
reasonably tailored response to that danger.281 Clay reasoned that the
color graphics would be subjective because the FDA chose images to
evoke emotional and visceral responses in an attempt to illegitimately
manipulate consumer decision-making.282
The majority criticized three flaws in the dissent’s reasoning. The
first was Clay’s willingness to consider the constitutionality of the
nine images that the FDA had selected.283 The majority also criticized
Clay for incorrectly relying on Central Hudson’s analysis284 and
conflating speech restrictions with compelled disclosures.285 Finally,
the majority criticized the dissent’s assertion that Zauderer’s analysis
cannot accommodate images that provoke a visceral response or
incite controversy: “Facts can disconcert, displease, provoke an

277. Id. at 528 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“Where I part with the majority is on what I
consider to be the constitutional flaw in the requirement for color graphic warning
labels.”).
278. Id. at 526.
279. Id. at 528.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 529.
282. See id. (“While it is permissible for the government to require a product
manufacturer to provide truthful information, even if perhaps frightening, to the
public in an effort to warn it of potential harms, it is less clearly permissible for the
government to simply frighten consumers or to otherwise attempt to flagrantly
manipulate the emotions of consumers as it seeks to do here.”). Clay augmented his
argument against the color graphics by asserting (1) that images cannot accurately
convey all information about the health consequences of smoking and (2) that
viewers will interpret the images differently. Id. As such, Clay reasoned the color
graphics did not “materially advance” the state’s interest to the extent that the
majority asserted they did. See id. at 530.
283. See id. at 527 (expressing willingness to evaluate the graphical warning labels
facially and as-applied).
284. See id. at 568 (Stranch, J., majority opinion) (criticizing the dissent for its
reliance on Central Hudson).
285. Id.
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emotional response, spark controversy, and even overwhelm reason,
but that does not magically turn such facts into opinions.”286
More than the majority, Clay recognized that Zauderer calls for
disclosures to be purely factual and uncontroversial, and this likely is
the primary disagreement between Clay and the majority concerning
the interpretation of Zauderer: How should the phrase “purely
factual and uncontroversial” be employed? For the majority, the
phrase triggers lenient, disclosure-friendly rational basis review.287 If
a disclosure fails to be factual, the majority would apply strict scrutiny
to the disclosure requirement. By contrast, for Clay the phrase
provides the essential standard at the core of Zauderer’s analysis.
Any disclosure that fails to be purely factual and uncontroversial is
thereby unconstitutional—no alternative analysis required.
According to Clay,
[t]hough the hurdle that Zauderer erects for the government is a
relatively low one, it is still a hurdle that the government must
surmount. . . . While courts have been resistant to strike down
disclosure requirements under Zauderer, if Zauderer does in fact
create a line, then it is clear that some types of disclosure
requirements must cross that line.288

2.

R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA

In the midst of the Commonwealth Brands/Discount Tobacco City
litigation, the FDA completed its assigned task under the Tobacco
Control Act and issued the nine finalized graphic warning labels,
complete with specific imagery and including the “1-800-QUITNOW” anti-smoking hotline. In response, the tobacco companies
revamped their arguments and chose a new venue to challenge the
FDA’s promulgated warning labels as unconstitutionally compelled
disclosures.289 The stage was set for R.J. Reynolds v. FDA.
Arguing for summary judgment in R.J. Reynolds, the tobacco
companies maintained that the finalized warning labels were not
purely factual and uncontroversial.
Thus, strict scrutiny, not
Zauderer’s framework, should govern whether the new graphic

286.
287.
288.
289.

Id. at 569.
See supra notes 226–27 and accompanying text.
Id. at 530 (Clay, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 13–27 and accompanying text.
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warnings were constitutional.290 The tobacco companies gave five
reasons why Zauderer’s framework should not apply.291 First, the
tobacco companies argued that the new warning labels were
persuasive, not informative.292
Second, they argued that the
illustrations and staged photographs like those used in the graphic
warnings could not factually or uncontroversially convey information
because of their emotionally charged content.293 Third, the antismoking hotline included in the warnings, “1-800-QUIT-NOW,” was
not a disclosure but a directive not to smoke.294 Fourth, requiring fifty
percent of the front and back of the cigarette packs to display the
warning labels was unduly burdensome.295 Fifth, the warnings were
ineffective at conveying information.296 These arguments presuppose
a very conservative interpretation of Zauderer’s framework—one
that (i) thoroughly assesses whether a disclosure is purely factual, (ii)
includes an undue burden inquiry, and (iii) requires the government
to prove the disclosure’s effectiveness.
On November 7, 2011, the District of the District of Columbia
granted the tobacco companies a preliminary injunction against the
graphic warning labels,297 and on February 29, 2012, the district court
granted summary judgment to the tobacco companies. 298 In both
instances, the district court found Zauderer’s framework inapplicable
and instead applied strict scrutiny to the graphic warning labels.299
For the district court, nothing about the graphic warning labels
suggested that they should be analyzed pursuant to Zauderer: “Put

290. See Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Permanent Injunction at
24–36, R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, No. 11-01482 (RJL) (D.D.C. Aug. 19, 2011), ECF No.
10.
291. See id. at 31–36.
292. See id. at 32 (“[The] FDA effectively concedes that the warnings are not
intended to inform, but rather, to persuade customers not to smoke.”).
293. See id. at 33–34 (“Such tactics are no closer to mere informational disclosures
than any of the ‘shock and awe’ advocacy used in numerous ideological debates, such
as when animal-rights activists display photographs of mutilated animals.” (emphasis
added)).
294. Id. at 35.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 36.
297. R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011), vacated, 696 F.3d
1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
298. R.J. Reynolds v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266 (D.D.C. 2012).
299. The district court situated Zauderer squarely within compelled speech
jurisprudence, characterizing Zauderer’s analysis as a narrow exception of the
presumptive unconstitutionality of compelled speech. See id. at 272 (discussing
Zauderer and compelled speech).
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simply the Government fails to convey any factual information
supported by evidence about the actual health consequences of
smoking through its use of these graphic images.”300 Subsequently,
the FDA appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
the tobacco companies, thus giving the D.C. Circuit its chance to
consider the constitutionality of the warning labels.301
The D.C. Circuit issued an opinion on August 24, 2012, affirming
the decision of the court below.302 Regarding its task, the court stated,
“The only question before us is whether FDA’s promulgation of the
graphic warning labels—which incorporate the textual warnings, a
corresponding graphic image, and the ‘1-800-QUIT-NOW’ cessation
hotline number—violates the First Amendment.”303 Like the panel in
Discount Tobacco City, the R.J. Reynolds court split two to one.304
Judge Janice Rogers Brown, joined by Judge A. Raymond Randolph,
applied Central Hudson’s four-step analysis to find the warning labels
unconstitutional infringements upon commercial speech.
To summarize the significance of the issue before it, the court
stated,
[t]his case raises novel questions about the scope of the
government’s authority to force the manufacturer of a product to go
beyond making purely factual and accurate commercial disclosures
and undermine its own economic interest—in this case, by making
“every single pack of cigarettes in the country [a] mini billboard” for
the government’s anti-smoking message.305

Unlike the other courts that considered the graphic warning labels,
the R.J. Reynolds majority, in addition to recognizing the elements of
compelled speech at issue, also highlighted the elements of forced
subsidization.306 Both created a presumption in favor of strict
scrutiny.307 Nonetheless, the court acknowledged two “narrow and
well-understood exceptions” to strict scrutiny—Zauderer’s analysis

300. See, e.g., id. at 272–73. The court’s profound distaste for the labels is
evidenced by its refusal even to call the labels “warnings” and making a point to refer
to them only as “images” because the court viewed the labels as emotionally charged
propaganda. Id. at 268 n.1.
301. See supra notes 297–300 and accompanying text.
302. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (2012).
303. Id. at 1211.
304. Id. at 1208.
305. Id. at 1212 (alteration in original).
306. See id at 1211. The court ultimately made little use of the line of cases dealing
with compelled subsidization.
307. Id.
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for compelled commercial disclosures and Central Hudson’s analysis
for commercial restrictions more generally.308 The R.J. Reynolds
court’s first task was to determine if either of these lower levels of
scrutiny applied.309
The court described Zauderer’s analysis as “akin to rational basis
review” and significantly less stringent than Central Hudson’s
analysis.310 Nonetheless, the R.J. Reynolds court tightly cabined the
ambit of Zauderer’s analysis. First, the court insisted that as an
exception to strict scrutiny, Zauderer’s framework only applies to
disclosures aimed at preventing consumer deception.311 Moreover,
the court read Ibanez and Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Milavetz
to establish that before applying Zauderer, the government must
show either that an advertisement is self-evidently deceptive or that it
presents some “potentially real” danger of consumer deception.312
Second, the court, like the Discount Tobacco City dissent, understood
Zauderer’s analysis to entail a demanding inquiry into whether the
disclosure is purely factual and uncontroversial.313 Finally, the court
seemed to posit that Zauderer’s analysis includes an inquiry into
whether a disclosure is unduly burdensome.314 Thus, the R.J.
Reynolds court presented a version of Zauderer on par with the most
conservative interpretations.
After laying out Zauderer’s framework, the D.C. Circuit concluded
that Zauderer’s exception was inapplicable to the graphic warning
labels for two reasons.315 First, the court determined that the FDA
308. Id. at 1212.
309. See id. at 1213–17 (determining the applicability of Zauderer or Central
Hudson analyses).
310. Id. at 1212.
311. See id. at 1213.
312. See id. at 1213–14 (discussing Ibanez and Milavetz and relying on Thomas’
concurrence in Milavetz for support). “Zauderer, Ibanez, and Milavetz thus establish
that a disclosure requirement is only appropriate if the government shows that,
absent a warning, there is self-evident—or at least ‘potentially real’—danger that an
advertisement will mislead consumers.” Id. at 1214.
313. See, e.g., id. at 1216 (“The disclosures approved in Zauderer and Milavetz
were clear statements that were both indisputably accurate and not subject to
misinterpretation by consumers.” (emphasis added)). The extent to which the court
proved willing to scrutinize the factuality of disclosure is best evidenced by the
reasons it gives for finding that the graphic warning labels did not constitute purely
factual and uncontroversial disclosures. See supra notes 303–09 and accompanying
text.
314. See id. at 1212 (“[D]isclosures are permissible . . . provided the requirements
are not ‘unjustified or unduly burdensome.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985))).
315. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (2012).
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had failed to prove that the purpose of the warning labels was to
prevent consumer deception.316 Second, the court found that the
warning labels did not fulfill Zauderer’s “purely factual and
uncontroversial” requirement.317
Because it could not find any danger of consumer deception that
the graphic warning labels specifically addressed, the court concluded
that the graphic warning labels were outside the purview of
Zauderer’s framework.318 The court’s reasoning was twofold. First,
any potential for deception that the advertising practices of tobacco
companies posed already had been adequately addressed.
Restrictions in the Tobacco Control Act, like those prohibiting the
use of terms like “low tar” and “light” alleviated concerns about the
Second, the
companies’ history of misleading advertising.319
government failed to prove that tobacco packaging itself was
misleading.320 The court stated that neither it nor the tobacco
companies denied the need for some disclosure,321 but that “none of
the proposed warnings purport to address the information gaps
identified by the government.”322
The R.J. Reynolds court gave a litany of reasons for finding that
the graphic warning labels were not purely factual and
uncontroversial reminiscent of those given by the district court and
the dissent in Discount Tobacco City.323 First, the R.J. Reynolds
majority claimed that the symbolic, non-literal nature of the images
rendered them nonfactual.324 Moreover, because they were symbolic,
consumers could potentially misinterpret them.325 The court also held
that because the FDA selected the images primarily to elicit an
emotional response, the warnings could not be purely factual.326
Finally, the court found aspects of the warning labels did not convey
316. Id. at 1214–16.
317. Id. at 1216–17.
318. See id. at 1217 (discussing how the new warning labels fail to prevent any
consumer deception).
319. See id. at 1215–16 (“While the Companies’ representations about ‘light’ or
‘low tar’ cigarettes might have been misleading, the Act now prohibits such
statements.” (citations omitted)).
320. Id. at 1215.
321. See id. (referring to the tobacco companies’ concession that some disclosure is
appropriate).
322. Id. at 1215 n.8.
323. See supra notes 269–74 and accompanying text.
324. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1216.
325. Id.
326. Id.
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any factual information but instead were intended to evoke emotion,
consumer embarrassment, and “browbeat consumers into quitting.”327
These nonfactual aspects of the warning labels included an antismoking hotline and specific images like the image of the woman
crying, the child, and the man wearing an “I Quit” t-shirt.328 Of the
images as a whole, the court stated, “While none of these images is
patently false, they certainly do not impart pure factual, accurate, or
uncontroversial information to consumers.”329
Although the R.J. Reynolds majority found Zauderer’s exception
inapplicable, the majority found that Central Hudson provided the
appropriate standard of scrutiny because it found the warning labels
to be a restriction on commercial speech.330 The court assumed, but
with some reluctance, that the government had a substantial interest
in reducing smoking rates.331 The government, however, failed to
meet the third step of Central Hudson: it failed to show that the
warning labels directly advanced that interest.332 Unlike the Discount
Tobacco City majority,333 the R.J. Reynolds majority was
underwhelmed with the success that other nations experienced by
implementing similar warnings.334 According to the court, the studies
documenting the effects on such warnings in Australia and Canada
did not establish that such warnings actually and directly reduced
smoking rates.335 Moreover, the FDA’s own analysis predicted that
the new warnings would reduce smoking rates by merely .088%.336

327. Id. at 1216–17.
328. See id. (“These inflammatory images and the provocatively-named hotline
cannot rationally be viewed as pure attempts to convey information to consumers.”).
329. Id. at 1217.
330. See id. Unlike the D.C. District Court, the R.J. Reynolds majority refused to
follow the Seventh Circuit’s example in Blagojevich, maintaining that its own
precedent required it to apply the standards for commercial speech articulated in
Central Hudson to compelled commercial disclosures. Id. (citing United States v.
Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
331. See id. at 1218 n.13 (“Like the district court, we are skeptical that the
government can assert a substantial interest in discouraging consumers from
purchasing a lawful product, even one that has been conclusively linked to adverse
health consequences.”).
332. Id. at 1222 (“FDA failed to present any data—much less the substantial
evidence required under the [Administrative Procedures Act]—showing that
enacting their proposed graphic warning labels will accomplish the agency’s stated
objective or reducing smoking rates.”).
333. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text.
334. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1219.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 1220.
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This evidence was hardly substantial and did not prove that the
warning labels directly advanced the government’s goal to a material
degree as required by Central Hudson’s analysis.337 As such, the court
held that the FDA’s promulgated graphic warning labels violated the
First Amendment as unconstitutional restrictions on commercial
speech, and remanded to the FDA, presumably for promulgation of
new warning labels.338

a.

The R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Dissent

Writing in dissent, Judge Judith W. Rogers argued that, with one
caveat,339 the FDA’s promulgated warning labels did not offend the
First Amendment. According to Rogers, of the two standards
applicable to regulation of commercial speech, Zauderer’s framework
should have been preferable to Central Hudson’s because the new
warnings presented factually accurate information.340 Regardless of
which of these two levels of scrutiny it chose, however, Rogers
believed that the court should have upheld the FDA promulgated
graphic warning labels.341 Rogers noted that the factual premises
underpinning the need for new warning labels were not in dispute:
those premises being (1) that tobacco is addicting; (2) that smoking
contributes to or causes a vast array of severe health conditions
including cancer, heart disease, and cerebrovascular disease; and (3)
that the public, and adolescents in particular, underestimate risks of
smoking.342 Rogers emphasized that it was indisputable that tobacco
companies had historically misled consumers about the true health
effects of smoking and the addictiveness of nicotine.343
Rogers reconstructed a First Amendment framework that
acknowledged the lesser protections for commercial speech but that
337. See id. at 1219.
338. Id. at 1222. However, the extent to which the FDA can promulgate new
warning labels consistent with the majority’s reasoning in R.J. Reynolds is an open
question.
339. Rogers acknowledged that the 1-800-QUIT-NOW phone number violated the
First Amendment. See id. at 1234, 1236 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (arguing that
inclusion of the anti-smoking hotline number respectively violated Zauderer’s and
Central Hudson’s analyses).
340. See id. at 1223 (arguing that Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny applies, but
asserting that the graphic warning labels satisfy Central Hudson’s four steps as well).
341. See id. at 1237–38 (“Because the warning label requirement . . . appears to
survive the First Amendment challenge under either Zauderer or Central Hudson, I
would reverse.”).
342. Id. at 1223–24.
343. Id. at 1224.
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also stressed the “material differences” between disclosure
requirements and outright prohibitions on speech.344 She identified
two triggering conditions necessary to garner Zauderer’s less exacting
scrutiny. Zauderer’s analysis applies to regulations if (1) they impose
a disclosure requirement rather than an affirmative limitation on
speech and (2) they are directed at potentially misleading speech.345 If
those two conditions are met, she asserted, Zauderer only requires
that the disclosures reasonably relate to the government’s interest.346
Rogers resisted expressly limiting the class of state interests
acceptable under Zauderer’s framework to preventing consumer
deception.347 Similarly, while she cautioned that a court should be
mindful of unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements,
this inquiry did not seem central to Zauderer’s analysis for her.348
Rogers argued that the likelihood of consumer deception was so
great for tobacco products that it did not matter that its packaging
and advertising did not contain any affirmative misstatement.349
“Common sense, experience, and substantial scientific evidence”
show that even with the existing warning labels, consumers continue
to misunderstand the implicit risks of tobacco use.350 Rogers noted
that the circuit had recognized that an attempt to capitalize on prior
instances of deception without disabusing consumers of any resulting
misperceptions is itself deceptive.351 The likelihood of consumer
deception was hardly speculative.352 Thus, the graphic warning labels
satisfied the first of Zauderer’s preconditions for less exacting
scrutiny.353
344. See id. at 1226 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 650).
345. See id. at 1227 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (quoting Milavetz, 130 S. Ct. at 1339).
346. See id. at 1233 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
347. Id. at 1227 n.6 (“[T]he Supreme Court appears simply to have held that a
government interest in protecting consumers from deception is sufficient to support a
disclosure requirement—not that this particular interest is necessary to support such
a requirement.).
348. See id. at 1233 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651). Rogers ultimately
concluded that the size and placement of the warning labels were reasonably related
to the government’s goals but did not expressly couch her analysis terms of undue
burdens.
349. Id. at 1228 (“Even absent any affirmatively misleading statements, cigarette
packages and other advertisements that fail to display the final costs of smoking in a
prominent manner are at least as misleading as the airline advertisements in Spirit
Airlines [obscure the true cost of tickets].” (citations omitted)).
350. Id.
351. Id. (citing Warner-Lambert Co. v. FTC, 572 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
352. Id. at 1229.
353. Id.
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The warning labels similarly satisfied the second precondition for

Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny; they required disclosure without
imposing an affirmative limitation on speech.354 Implicit in Rogers’
argument are the ideas (1) that the phrase “purely factual and
uncontroversial” defines what qualifies as a disclosure and (2) to
compel anything other than purely factual and uncontroversial
information would qualify as an affirmative limitation on speech. For
Rogers, the graphic warning labels met this definition because they
were factual, accurate, and uncontroversial.
Rogers thoroughly defended the factual nature of the graphic
warning labels. The majority erred, Rogers believed, in isolating the
graphic content of the warning labels from their textual content.
When viewed in connection with its respective textual warning, each
image conveyed the textual warning more effectively without
rendering the warning label inaccurate or nonfactual.355 This was true
even of specific images—like the image of the man wearing an “I
QUIT” t-shirt—that the tobacco companies singled out as either
nonfactual or inaccurate.356 As the Discount Tobacco City court had
done before her,357 Rogers emphasized that the Zauderer Court had
lauded illustrations for their ability to attract attention and to convey
information directly.358 Images retain the ability to effectively and
efficiently convey information regardless of whether they are
“digitally enhanced, illustrated, or symbolic,” but that quality does
not render them nonfactual.359 Rogers further denied that the images
were nonfactual or inaccurate because (1) they created a visceral
reaction in consumers360 or (2) they could dissuade consumers from

354. See id. at 1229–32 (discussing how the graphic warning labels qualify as purely
factual disclosure under Zauderer).
355. See id. at 1231 (stating that the images must be assessed in connection with
the textual warning).
356. The five images to which the tobacco companies specifically objected were:
(1) the autopsied torso, (2) the man smoking from his tracheotomy hole, (3) the man
in the “I QUIT” t-shirt, (4) the crying baby enveloped in smoke, and (5) the crying
woman. Id. at 1231. Rogers elaborated on how each functioned to express the
warnings’ overall factual message. Id. at 1231–32.
357. See supra note 247 and accompanying text.
358. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (citing Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985)).
359. Id. at 1230.
360. Id. (“That such images are not invariably comforting to look at does not
necessarily make them inaccurate.”).
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smoking by evoking negative emotional reactions.361 According to
Rogers, “Factually accurate, emotive, and persuasive are not
mutually exclusive descriptions; the emotive quality of the selected
images does not necessarily undermine the warnings’ factual
accuracy.”362
Unconvinced by arguments that the graphic warnings were neither
factual nor accurate, Rogers stated that graphic warnings had met
both preconditions and, thus, triggered Zauderer’s less exacting
scrutiny.363 It then remained only to prove that the warning labels
were reasonably related to the government’s interest in effectively
communicating the negative health consequences of smoking.364 To
do so, Rogers summarily asserted that the graphic warning labels,
their size, and their placement were reasonably related to the
government’s interest.365 She concluded that the warning label
requirement appeared constitutional under Zauderer.366
Judge Rogers assessed the graphic warning labels under Central
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny as well.367 Under Central Hudson, she
found that the new warning labels directly advanced the
government’s substantial interest in reducing smoking rates and
effectively conveying the risks of smoking, and that they were no
more extensive than necessary.368
Thus, under either Central
Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny or Zauderer’s less exacting scrutiny,
Rogers would have found that the warning labels did not violate the
First Amendment.369

361. See id. (“[T]he FDA’s reliance on [emotional] salience measures [in selecting
the warning labels] was in the service of—not inconsistent with—the warnings’
informational purpose.”).
362. Id. Rogers stopped just shy of claiming that there was no legally relevant
distinction between fact and emotion. See id. at 1231 (“Unsurprisingly, the tobacco
companies point neither to any case law in support of this argument nor to any legally
significant distinction between fact and emotion.”).
363. See id. at 1233 (reconstructing Zauderer’s framework for compelled
disclosures directed at misleading commercial speech).
364. See id. at 1233.
365. In support of this conclusion, Rogers cited—without discussion—common
sense and the evidence that the FDA provided as justification for new graphics when
it first proposed them and then published the Final Rule. See id. (citing Proposed
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 69,531–32; Final Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 36,637).
366. Id. at 1233 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
367. Id. at 1234–37.
368. Id.
369. See id. at 1223 (stating that the warning labels should survive under both
Zauderer and Central Hudson).
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Judge Rogers did not categorically endorse the new warning labels.
By including the anti-smoking hotline, she believed the FDA had
gone too far.370 She found that Zauderer was inapt for assessing the
constitutionality of the antismoking hotline because it did not qualify
as a factual disclosure.371 Unlike the labels’ images, for which Rogers
insisted upon a holistic assessment to determine the warning labels’
factuality under Zauderer,372 Rogers suggested the “1-800-QUITNOW” hotline number could be severed and assessed
independently.373 The hotline ultimately failed the final step of
Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny; the government had not
proven that less burdensome alternatives were inadequate.374
Presumably, such less intrusive alternatives would not mandate that
cigarette packages “prominently” bear an imperative “directing
consumers to ‘QUIT NOW.’”375
Despite the great pains the Discount Tobacco City majority took to
preempt any inconsistency between its decision and the thenforthcoming decision in R.J. Reynolds,376 the two decisions cannot be
reconciled readily based on the fact that the Sixth Circuit denied a
facial challenge to the provision of the Tobacco Control Act
mandating the new warning labels while the D.C. Circuit ruled that
the specific warning labels promulgated by the FDA were
unconstitutional. The two decisions are fundamentally at odds on a
number of key points essential in determining the limits of compelled
commercial disclosures under the First Amendment. First, the two
decisions disagree on the application and ambit of Zauderer’s lenient

370. Id. at 1223 (stating that the graphic warning labels appear to be constitutional
except for the inclusion of the “1-800-QUIT-NOW” number).
371. Id. at 1234.
372. See supra notes 355–56 and accompanying text.
373. Rogers’s argument for this seems to be twofold. First, Rogers noted the FDA
included the hotline number on the new warning labels pursuant to separate
statutory authority from than the statutory authority mandating the warning labels
themselves. See id. at 1234. Second, nothing indicated the FDA would not have
promulgated a version of warning labels lacking the antismoking hotline. Id. at 1237
n.12.
374. Id. at 1236.
375. See id. Rogers does not make clear what less burdensome alternatives to the
inclusion of the antismoking hotline the FDA might have implemented, but her tone
suggests that the prominence and the imperative nature of the label was unnecessary
to fulfill the statutory mandate on which the inclusion of the phone number was
based.
376. See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509,
568–69 (6th Cir. 2012) (criticizing the dissent for conflating its analysis of the
provision with an as-applied challenge of the nine images).
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scrutiny. Second, the two decisions contain inconsistent arguments
concerning the ability of images to convey factual, accurate, and
uncontroversial information. The remainder of this Note attempts to
provide an interpretation of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Zauderer that respects the Court’s reasoning, and more importantly
the First Amendment principles it espoused. In doing so, this Note
will evaluate certain aspects the Sixth Circuit’s and D.C. Circuit’s
assessment of the new graphic warning labels in the context of that
understanding of Zauderer’s application and ambit.
III. STRIKE A MATCH: ILLUMINATING ZAUDERER

Zauderer should be interpreted to establish a three-step analysis
for determining if a disclosure violates the First Amendment. First, a
court should determine whether the disclosure is limited to purely
commercial speech. If not, the disclosure should be subject to strict
scrutiny.377 Second, the content of the disclosed information must be
purely factual and uncontroversial.
Purely factual and
uncontroversial content may be conveyed through any appropriate
mode including text or illustrations, may be selective and
underinclusive, and need not be emotionally sterile. A disclosure,
however, cannot expressly advocate a position through nonfactual
directives or include value judgments. Third, the disclosure must
reasonably relate to preventing consumer deception or confusion, but
this reasonable relationship need not be the government’s primary or
exclusive aim. This entails any government purpose meant to
increase the consumers’ access to purely factual and uncontroversial
information as long as there is a showing that the potential for
confusion is not purely speculative.
Put succinctly:
Step One: Does the disclosure regulate purely commercial speech?
If not, strict scrutiny applies.

Step Two: Is the disclosure purely factual and uncontroversial? If
not, Central Hudson’s intermediate scrutiny applies.378
Step Three: Is the disclosure reasonably related to preventing
potential consumer confusion or deception?

377. See Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
378. Arguing that Central Hudson provides the proper alternative to Zauderer is
beyond the scope of this Note, but the facts of Pacific Gas suggests as much. See
supra notes 78–92 and accompanying text.
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If all three steps are satisfied, the disclosure requirement does not
offend the First Amendment.
But this framework is only the beginning of a unified, consistent
understanding of Zauderer. In the following sections, this Note
tackles three interpretive questions already articulated: first, what
constitutes a purely factual and uncontroversial disclosure; second,
whether a court should apply Zauderer if the government’s purpose is
not to prevent consumer deception; and finally, the role (if any) that
the burdens imposed on a compelled commercial speaker by
disclosures should play in a court’s Zauderer analysis.
A. “Purely Factual and Uncontroversial”
The first limitation that Zauderer imposes is that the disclosure
must convey only purely factual and uncontroversial information.379
The Supreme Court did not explain, however, how the phrase “purely
factual and uncontroversial” fits within Zauderer’s framework for
compelled disclosures.380 Since Zauderer, courts and judges have
disagreed about the role that the phrase plays in Zauderer’s
framework.381 Nevertheless, what has yet to be made explicit is that
the phrase served dual roles in the Court’s analysis. Courts often
conflate these two roles when they interpret Zauderer.382 The first
role is a limit on the content of disclosure requirements. In this role,
the phrase is definitional. But, by limiting their content, the phrase
also precludes disclosures from illegitimately becoming advocacy,
and, thus, justifies lowered scrutiny when the government’s aim is
proper. This is its second role. In fact, the phrase provides the
staunchest safeguard against abusive disclosure requirements.

379. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985).
380. The Zauderer Court did not refer to the factual or uncontroversial aspects of
disclosure when it stated “an advertiser’s rights are adequately protected as long as
disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing
deception of consumers.” Id.
381. The disagreement within the panel in Discount Tobacco City provides a
perfect illustration. The majority interpreted Zauderer to require that disclosures
simply be factual or accurate, while the dissent insisted that Zauderer proscribed the
stricter standard that disclosures be purely factual and uncontroversial.
382. See, e.g., Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 114 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“Required disclosure of accurate factual information presents little risk that the
state is forcing speakers to adopt disagreeable state-sanctioned positions, suppressing
dissent, confounding the speaker’s attempts to participate in self governance, or
interference with an individual’s right to define and express his or her own
personality.”).
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The Factual Component

Both the definitional and the justificatory aspects of the phase are
illuminated when the Court contrasts compelled disclosure of “purely
factual and uncontroversial” information with compelled speech that
“prescribe[s] what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion.”383 In doing so, the Court implicitly
defined disclosure as the presentation of “purely factual and
uncontroversial” information about a commercial product. Call this
the factual component of the standard. The factual component
addresses how disclosures differ from other forms of compelled
speech. That is to say, the factual component of the phrase limits the
content of disclosures. By contrast, the forced presentation of
orthodox political, religious, or other opinions is not a disclosure; it is
advocacy.
It is not a simple matter to articulate precisely what content
satisfies the factual component. The Court did not elaborate in
Zauderer or Milavetz.384 Nevertheless, circuits have employed an
intuitive notion of what content is acceptably deemed factual and
used this notion to disqualify some apparent disclosures that were not
appropriately factual.385 At a minimum, the intuitive notion of factual
content for disclosures includes three broad categories. The first
category includes information about a product’s (or service’s)
origin—for example, its composition, its manufacturing process, a
specialist’s educational credentials, etc. The second category includes
information about legally accepted classifications pertinent to the
product or service.386 The third category covers information about the
consequences of a product or its use, including the product’s true
cost387 or the health consequences associated with the product.388 For
cigarettes, these include heart disease, lung cancer, or even, perhaps,

383. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
384. The only language that Milavetz offered that might potentially elaborate on
the factual component is the term “accurate,” which the court seemingly uses
synonymously with “factual.” See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States,
559 U.S. 229, 250 (2010).
385. See Video Software Dealers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 556 F.3d 950, 966–67
(9th Cir. 2009); Entm’t Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 469 F.3d 641, 652 (7th Cir.
2006).
386. The disclosure at issue in Milavetz falls within this category. See 559 U.S. 229.
387. See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc., v. USDOT, 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(upholding requirement that airlines conspicuously disclose total cost of airfare).
388. See, e.g., N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir.
2009) (required disclosure of calorie count on menus).
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bad breath. Because warning labels alert consumers to non-apparent
consequences, they fit within this category.
A number of arguments proffered against the new warning labels
misunderstand how the factual component limits the content of
disclosures.389 First, both the D.C. District Court and the Discount
Tobacco City dissent, to varying degrees, asserted that illustrations
and staged photographs could never be factual.390 An illustration (the
D.C. District Court preferred the term “cartoon”) is neither
categorically factual nor nonfactual.
Illustrations, words,
photographs, symbols, and hieroglyphs account for the mode of
disclosure. Zauderer did not suggest that some modes of disclosure
are acceptable while others are not. The Tobacco Control Act
directed the FDA to promulgate factual imagery because textual
warnings had proven ineffective.391 The fact that imagery differs from
text as a mode of expression does not undermine its capacity to
convey factual information.392 As long as the content is factual,
Zauderer does not restrict a disclosure’s mode of expression.
Similarly, representational content does not offend Zauderer’s
factual component. The R.J. Reynolds majority criticized the FDA
for incorporating images designed to “symbolize” the textual
content,393 and the court below cited the fact that the warning labels

389. See supra note 24–27 and accompanying text (enumerating the tobacco
companies’ arguments that the new graphic warning labels violated the First
Amendment).
390. See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 526
(6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J. dissenting) (arguing that “graphic, full-color images because
of the inherently persuasive character of the visual medium, cannot be presumed
neutral”); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 823 F. Supp. 2d 36, 45 (D.D.C. 2011)
(“Indeed, the fact alone that some of the graphic images here appear to be cartoons,
and others appear to be digitally enhanced or manipulated, would seem to
contravene the very definition of ‘purely factual.’”). Ironically, the Court in
Zauderer found nothing problematic in the use of illustration as a mode for
conveying factual information and overturned a restriction on illustrations in
advertising. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471
U.S. 626, 647–48 (1985); see also Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 560 (“Zauderer
itself eviscerates the argument that a picture or drawing cannot be accurate and
factual.”).
391. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (2012).
392. The Discount Tobacco City majority’s discussion of this topic is highly
illuminating and should conclusively put this argument against the graphic warning
labels to rest. See Discount Tobacco City, 674 F.3d at 559–61 (discussing the ability of
imagery to convey factual information pursuant to the standards articulated in
Zauderer). “We can envision many graphic warnings that would constitute factual
disclosures under Zauderer.” Id. at 559.
393. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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incorporated staged photographs and illustrations as a reason to
This assessment
withhold Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny.394
misapprehends how images convey general factual information. An
illustrated image of a diseased lung used to convey the proposition
that “smoking causes cancer” is no less factual than a photograph of
an actual cancerous lung used to convey the same information.395
Both operate representationally or symbolically. It is no more
convincing than arguing that a textual sentence is not factual because
words are not the things they represent, nor is a sentence the
proposition it symbolizes. Such arguments are premised on a
muddled understanding of linguistics. If the graphic warning labels
offend Zauderer’s factual component, it cannot be because its images
are symbolic. If the graphic warning labels offend Zauderer’s factual
component, it is because their images symbolize nonfactual content.396
A second argument that the tobacco companies advanced is that
images that elicit emotion cannot be purely factual. This argument,
too, is suspect. While the vast majority of facts are emotionally
neutral, not every fact is without emotional appeal. Certain facts,
those that implicate an individual’s underlying values, will elicit
emotion. One could argue that the more a value is universally shared
and deeply held, the more likely a fact implicating that value will
elicit emotion from the listener. Facts that implicate an individual’s
health unsurprisingly elicit emotion.397 Whether the content of the
warning labels elicits emotion is a separate question from whether it
is factual.398 As such, the factual component of Zauderer, even

394. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 272 n.12 (D.D.C.
2012).
395. It is worth noting that text, too, is always representational. But no one would
argue that text cannot represent facts.
396. See, e.g., R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1230 (Rogers, J., dissenting) (“Contrary
to the tobacco companies’ suggestion the use of graphic images even if digitally
enhanced, illustrated, or symbolic, does not necessarily make the warnings
nonfactual.” (citations omitted)).
397. See id. at 1231 (arguing that the tobacco companies argument would
increasingly constrain disclosures requirements as the health consequences of
smoking became more dire).
398. Recall that the distinction the Zauderer Court correctly drew for First
Amendment purposes is between “fact” and “advocacy.” This argument errs in
conflating “advocacy” with “persuasion.” If Zauderer’s factual component limited
the content of disclosures to non-persuasive facts, then Zauderer would effectively
render all disclosures impotent. See id. at 1230 (“[F]actually accurate, emotive, and
persuasive are not mutually exclusive descriptions; the emotive quality of the selected
images does not necessarily undermine the warnings’ factual accuracy.”).
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though it restricts outright advocacy, nonetheless will permit content
that legitimately elicits emotion.
Insofar as the R.J. Reynolds majority objected to the images
because the FDA selected them for their persuasive effect,399 neither
Zauderer nor Milavetz supports the claim that selective disclosure
undermines the factual nature of the information presented.400 The
purpose of disclosure cannot alter the content of what is disclosed. If
the R.J. Reynolds court’s criticism, however, was that the disclosures
were crafted to shock or embarrass smokers and, in turn, to
“browbeat consumers into quitting,”401 then the court is no longer
strictly assessing the content of the warning labels. Rather, the
court’s true criticism would be that the FDA’s aim violated the
analysis prescribed in Zauderer. This criticism raises a tough
question: if the selective presentation of purely factual information
can have the same persuasive effect as outright advocacy, why should
Zauderer draw a distinction between compelled factual disclosures
and outright advocacy? To answer this question, it helps to
understand the second function of the phrase “purely factual and
uncontroversial” in the Court’s reasoning in Zauderer.

2.

The Uncontroversial Component

By limiting disclosures to purely factual and uncontroversial
information, the Court in Zauderer did more than simply define
acceptable content for disclosures. In addition to the definitional
aspect, the phrase “purely factual and uncontroversial” entails a
normative presumption. This normative presumption provides the
primary justification for leniency toward compelled disclosure of
purely factual and uncontroversial information. An individual is
always justified in believing purely factual and uncontroversial
information and can be presumed to believe such information absent
irrationality, mistake, or deception. The same presumption does not
hold when the government “prescribes what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion.”402 Call this

399. See id. at 1216 (finding that the graphic warning labels cannot be purely
factual because the FDA tacitly admits they were selected for their ability to evoke
emotion).
400. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229 (2010);
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
401. R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1217.
402. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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the “uncontroversial” component of the standard.403 Purely factual
and uncontroversial information constitutes an epistemically benign,
universally acceptable orthodoxy. Pure, uncontroversial facts are not
a matter of opinion or ideology. An individual should not be
assumed to be irrational, deceived, or mistaken for not holding a
particular opinion or subscribing to a particular ideology, even if that
opinion or ideology is widely accepted. As far back as Wooley and
Barnette, the Court rebuked attempts to instill opinions and beliefs,
even popular ones like patriotism404 or state pride,405 at the expense of
an individual’s own beliefs. The Court, however, has not been
concerned about infringing upon an individual’s right to selfdetermination or “freedom of mind” when purely factual and
uncontroversial information is involved because such information is
presumed to be epistemically benign.406
The First Amendment interests of the speaker have traditionally
fueled the Court’s compelled speech jurisprudence.407 Once the Court
in Zauderer—by situating disclosures within commercial speech
jurisprudence—undermined the traditional rationale for holding
compelled speech presumptively unconstitutional in two ways. First,
it diminished the commercial speaker’s interests, describing them as
“minimal.”408 This, nonetheless, cannot be the full story. Professor
403. The division of the phrase into its dual components should not be understood
to mean that the phrase can be cleft cleanly into a “factual” element and
“uncontroversial” element. The distinction is meant to provide a framework for
discussing the two separate functions that the phrase implicitly serves in the Court’s
reasoning. “Uncontroversial” and “factual” equally provide limits on the content of
disclosures, even if term “factual” seems to delineate more apparently those
limitations. Similarly, “factual” and “uncontroversial” equally imply the normative
presumption justifying the Court’s lowered scrutiny, even if the term
“uncontroversial” carries the normative connotations more clearly than does
“factual.”
404. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (invalidating
compelled participation in the Pledge of Allegiance in schools); see also supra notes
37–49 and accompanying text.
405. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (finding that compelled inclusion
of state motto on license plates violated the First Amendment); see also supra notes
59–66 and accompanying text.
406. Compare Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (“But the interests at stake in this case are
not of the same order as those discussed in Wooley, Tornillo, and Barnette.”), with
Barnette, 319 U.S. at 633.
407. See Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 147 (2006)
(enumerating the possible, primarily speaker-based justifications for the First
Amendment offense of compelled speech); see also Greene, supra note 46; Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L.
REV. 839 (2005).
408. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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Laurent Sacharoff has argued that the traditional justifications
underlying compelled speech jurisprudence disproportionately focus
on the speaker’s interests.409 The real concern in compelled speech,
Sacharoff argues, is that it can “unfairly distort what listeners hear in
an effort to control the minds and thoughts of those listeners.”410
Minimizing the commercial speaker’s interest does not address the
concern that a consumer’s interests may be infringed by a compelled
commercial disclosure. Second, the Court acknowledged the First
Amendment “value[s]” consumer access to information.411 This
assertion, however, is at odds with the legitimate First Amendment
concern that the government should not artificially distort to what
information consumers have access. Why should the Court grant the
government deference when it compels disclosures but not when it
compels an ideological message?
The uncontroversial component of Zauderer’s framework supplies
the answer. Disclosure of pure, uncontroversial facts alleviates
concerns that the government is infringing upon listeners’ legitimate
First Amendment interests. The First Amendment protects an
individual from illegitimate persuasive influences that inhibit the
individual’s self-determination, autonomy, or freedom of mind.412 But
purely factual and uncontroversial disclosures only expose an
individual to information that she would otherwise believe absent
deception, mistake, or irrationality. Thus, the individual is not
illegitimately persuaded. The Court uniquely favors disclosure
because it rectifies deception, confusion, and mistake—factors that
themselves inhibit an individual’s freedom of mind, autonomy, and
self-determination.
Recall the R.J. Reynolds court’s apparent concern that selective
disclosures seem functionally equivalent to advocacy.413 If purely
factual and uncontroversial information can be persuasive and still
remain entirely factual, it is because that information affects values
already widely shared. Hence, some factual information can evoke an
emotional response with the sort of persuasive effect that the R.J.
Reynolds court presumptively worried about. Nonetheless, it does
409. See Sacharoff, supra note 49, at 335; see also Alexander, supra note 407;
Greene, supra note 46.
410. Sacharoff, supra note 49, at 384.
411. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
412. See Sacharoff, supra note 49, at 373–80.
413. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(calling the new warning labels unabashed attempts to evoke emotion and browbeat
consumers into quitting).
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not render the information nonfactual. Nor does it infringe upon a
person’s right to self-determination, freedom of mind, or autonomy,
because the information is of the sort that the person is presumed to
believe absent irrationality, mistake, or deception. On the other
hand, nonfactual advocacy attempts to instill opinions, values, or
beliefs by taking advantage of the listener’s irrationality, mistake, or
deception. This is the line that Zauderer drew. Disclosures limited to
purely factual and uncontroversial information do not entail such
illegitimate persuasion, because their persuasive force is the result of
the factual information’s affect on the audience’s independently held,
widely shared values.414
B.

“Reasonably Related to the State’s Interest in Preventing the
Deception of Consumers”

Does Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny apply when the government’s
interest is not primarily to prevent consumer deception? Zauderer
and Milavetz addressed disclosure requirements expressly aimed at
preventing consumer deception. The R.J. Reynolds majority fixated
on this fact to restrict Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny to disclosures
This
specifically aimed at preventing consumer deception.415
interpretation, however, reads Zauderer too narrowly. The reasoning
the Court employs in Zauderer and the First Amendment principles it
expounds do not require courts to confine Zauderer’s ambit tightly to
disclosures exclusively and primarily aimed at preventing consumer
deception. There are three reasons for this.
First, restricting disclosures to cases of intentionally deceptive
commercial speech does not adequately further the First Amendment
values that the Zauderer Court invoked. In Zauderer, the Court was
concerned primarily with alleviating the potential that a consumer
might be misled, not preventing deception narrowly defined. While
disclosures can effectively prevent deception, they can also remedy
prior deception. More importantly, they can prevent or remedy
consumer confusion, as well. The Zauderer Court recognized this
when it referenced a string of decisions commending disclosures for
their ability to “dissipate the possibility of consumer confusion or

414. This concept also illustrates a limitation on the persuasive force of factual
disclosures. Independently held, widely shared values are a rarity, not the norm. An
individual’s concern for his or her own health and wellbeing happen to be one.
415. “By its own terms, Zauderer’s holding is limited to cases in which disclosure
requirements are ‘reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of
consumers.’” R.J. Reynolds, 696 F.3d at 1213 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651).
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deception.”416 Instead of concentrating on whether the commercial
speaker knowingly aimed to deceive, the Court emphasized
consumers’ interest in avoiding inaccurate information or potentially
drawing incorrect conclusions independent of the commercial
speaker’s intentions.417
Second, neither Milavetz nor Zauderer saddles the government
with a stringent burden of proof. In Zauderer, the Court rejected the
lawyer’s contention that the State failed to show that his
advertisements were actually deceptive. Instead, the court found that
the potential for deception was self-evident without proof by the
State of a tendency to mislead.418 In Milavetz, the Court found that
statements in the congressional record sufficiently established the
potential to mislead was “hardly a speculative one.”419 To restrict
Zauderer’s ambit to disclosures primarily aimed at directly preventing
consumer deception is inconsistent with the deference that the Court
has shown to the government’s purpose when analyzing disclosure
requirements under Zauderer.420

416. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (emphasis added) (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191, 201 (1982)) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24
(1976)). The fact that Zauderer opinion is not a model of clarity on this issue should
give pause to courts wishing to restrict Zauderer’s ambit to disclosures aimed at
preventing intentionally deceptive commercial speech.
417. Id. at 652 (explaining how laypersons are often unaware of the technical
meanings of terms such as “costs” and “fees” and could be expected to be misled
because of that lack of knowledge). It is even more difficult to maintain the position
that the Court prescribed Zauderer’s analysis strictly to disclosures aimed at
preventing deception when considering the disclosures upheld in Milavetz. The
provisions at issue in Milavetz required advertisements to disclose legal information
about the Bankruptcy Abuse Act. See supra note 166–174 and accompanying text.
The decision never indicated that the plaintiff law firm had an interest in deceiving its
clients about the Act or the firm’s services. Although the Court described the
disclosures at issues as “directed at misleading commercial speech,” only in the
loosest sense can this be accurate—that is, consumers could potentially draw
incorrect inferences if the advertisements lacked the disclosed factual information.
See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 250–51 (2010).
418. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652.
419. Milavetz, 559 U.S. at 251 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652).
420. Compare R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1213–15 (D.C.
Cir. 2012) (disclosures must address specific claims of deception before Zauderer
applies, ignoring government findings on consumer misapprehension of tobacco
risks), with Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652–53 (holding that where deception is selfevident the state need not conduct a public survey to prove consumer
misapprehension).
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Finally, tightly confining Zauderer’s ambit to disclosures directly or
primarily aimed at preventing consumer deception ignores
Zauderer’s position in the broader First Amendment framework. It
conflates Zauderer’s lenient “reasonably related” analysis with the
more stringent third step in Central Hudson, which mandates that the
regulation directly advance the state’s interest.421 The Court did not
incorporate such an inquiry in its analysis in Zauderer. Nor did the
Zauderer Court suggest that preventing deception must be the State’s
exclusive goal. Rather, the phrase “reasonably related” suggests a
liberal understanding of which state interests Zauderer’s analysis
condones. The proper inquiry is whether there is a rational
connection between the disclosure requirement and preventing
deception or confusion, regardless of the State’s primary purpose for
disclosure.422
This understanding of Zauderer’s ambit best accounts for the
ubiquitous role that commercial disclosures play in modern
regulatory schemes. Consider, for example, the FDA’s nutritional
labels. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) requires
all products classified as “food” to bear nutritional labels identifying a
product’s ingredients and nutritional contents.423 Pursuant to the
FDCA, the FDA has promulgated rules specifying the format and
package location for the warning labels.424 Products not labeled in
compliance with the FDCA, either because the package conveys
misleading statements or because the product fails to bear the correct
nutritional label, are “misbranded.”425 Under a narrow interpretation
of “aimed at preventing deception,” the FDA would not be able to
compel nutritional labels on products unless the product was
intentionally misbranded with a misleading statement. A narrow
interpretation would subject the most innocuous compelled
commercial disclosures, nutritional labels, to a much more stringent
First Amendment scrutiny. This result is not consistent with the
principle that “the First Amendment protection to commercial speech
421. See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
422. The Discount Tobacco City majority takes an even more lax interpretation.
See Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 556 (6th Cir.
2012) (“[Z]auderer’s framework can apply even if the required disclosure’s purpose is
something other than or in addition to preventing consumer deception.” (emphasis
added)).
423. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(f) (2012); see generally, Krista Hessler Carver, A Global
View of the First Amendment Constraints on FDA, 63 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 151
(2008).
424. 21 C.F.R § 101.1 (2013).
425. 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (2012).
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is justified principally by the value to the consumers of information
such speech provides.”426
Therefore, the Court’s phrase “preventing consumer deception”
should be unpacked, made explicit, and made consistent with the
Court’s own reasoning so that it is broad enough to include
government purposes reasonably related to preventing potential
confusion or deception of consumers.427 This interpretation places the
emphasis equally on the commercial speech’s effect on the consumer
and the intent of the commercial speaker. It alleviates the burden
that a strict interpretation of “preventing deception” would place on
the government to prove actual deception, a burden the Court has not
placed on the government. Finally, it gives courts sufficient latitude
to invalidate disclosures when the government’s purpose is
disingenuously or too tenuously related to preventing confusion or
deception.428
C.

“Unjustified or Unduly Burdensome Disclosure
Requirements”

Finally, courts should not mistakenly assess the burden imposed by
purely factual and uncontroversial commercial disclosures. Once
triggered, Zauderer’s sole inquiry is whether the disclosure
reasonably relates to the aim of preventing consumer confusion or
deception. The Zauderer Court expressly stated that it would not
subject disclosures to a least restrictive means assessment.429 Several
courts have failed to appreciate this when applying Zauderer’s
analysis. This violates the logic of the Court’s reasoning in Zauderer
and Milavetz:
We recognize that unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure
requirements might offend the First Amendment by chilling
426. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
427. The analysis by the Second Circuit in Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n provides a
model. See Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001).
428. It is still within a court’s power to invalidate a law when the government is
unable “to point to any harm that is potentially real, not purely hypothetical.” Ibanez
v. Fla. Dep’t of Bus. and Prof’l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 146 (1994). The Federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals have proven willing to give Zauderer’s analysis these teeth.
See Int’l Dairy Foods Ass’n v Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 643 (6th Cir. 2010) (severing a
“contiguity” provision while upholding the rest of a disclosure requirement because
evidence cited for the “contiguity” provision was anecdotal).
429. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 n.14 (“We reject appellant’s contention that we
should subject disclosure requirements to a strict ‘least restrictive means’ analysis . . .
[We] have recommended disclosure requirement as one of the acceptable less
restrictive alternatives to actual suppression of speech.”).
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protected commercial speech.

But we hold that an advertiser’s
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements
are reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception
of consumers.430

Although subtle, this language indicates that it is sufficient, first,
that the compelled speech at issue is a disclosure requirement,431 and
second, that disclosure is reasonably related to that preventing
consumer deception. Thus, a statement preceding the articulation of
Zauderer’s relaxed scrutiny—i.e. “that unjustified or unduly
burdensome disclosure requirements might offend the First
Amendment”—is not a further step in its analysis, but is, instead, the
general principle to which Zauderer’s relaxed scrutiny is an
exception. Courts that assess the burdens imposed by disclosure or
look to other less restrictive alternatives add conditions to Zauderer’s
analysis absent from the language of the opinion.
As such, although a court is free to and should assess the relative
burdens of a disclosure when applying more stringent scrutiny,
Zauderer precludes this step. This preclusion should not be
worrisome, because other aspects of Zauderer’s analysis safeguard
against unjustified burdens on commercial speech, most prominently
the “purely factual and uncontroversial” components of the analysis.
Alternatively, by avoiding a least restrictive means-type analysis, the
Zauderer court has granted the government sufficient latitude to
tailor effective disclosures. As the Discount Tobacco City majority
stated, “A warning that is not noticed, read, or understood by
consumers does not serve its function.”432 An undue burden or least
restrictive means analysis would require courts to weigh the
effectiveness of disclosures against the burden imposed on the
commercial speaker. This is inconsistent with the Zauderer Court’s
own statement that the “[commercial speaker’s] constitutionally
protected interest in not providing any particular factual information
in his advertising is minimal.”433 Because Zauderer’s analysis ensures

430. Id. at 651 (emphasis added); see also Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
United States, 559 U.S. 229, 249–50 (2010). Note that in Milavetz, the Court omitted
the term “commercial” when it acknowledged that unduly burdensome disclosures
have the potential to chill “protected speech.” This suggests even more strongly that
the Court is unconcerned with burdens imposed by accurate commercial disclosures.
431. That is to say, it compels purely factual and uncontroversial information about
a product or service from a commercial speaker.
432. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 564 (6th Cir.
2012).
433. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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that the information disclosed is purely factual and uncontroversial
and therefore benign from a First Amendment perspective, courts can
defer to the legislatures to craft disclosure requirements that
effectively prevent consumer deception and confusion.
CONCLUSION
On October 26, 2012, the tobacco companies petitioned the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in Discount Tobacco City, now
under its third caption, American Snuff Co. v. United States.434 The
Court denied certiorari on April 22, 2013.435 Meanwhile, after the
D.C. Circuit denied the agency’s motion for a rehearing en banc,436
the FDA opted not to seek Supreme Court review in R.J. Reynolds.437
Instead, the FDA will retry its hand at promulgating graphic warning
labels consistent with the Tobacco Control Act’s directive.438 For
now, the vast edifice of compelled commercial disclosures built on
Zauderer’s lenient scrutiny will remain relatively unaffected. For
now, cigarette packages will continue to bear “[the] boring, bold,
black and white . . . statement that these neat little soldiers of death
are, in fact, trying to kill you.”439 For now the warning on cigarette
packages will remain a cold, unlit, and factual statement lacking
emotionally incendiary images of diseased lungs, rotted teeth, or
incubated infants.

434. See Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Am. Snuff Co. v. United
States, No. 12-521 (U.S. Oct. 26, 2012).
435. Discount Tobacco City & Lottery v. United States, 674 F.3d 509 (6th Cir.
2012), cert. denied sub nom. Am. Snuff Co. LLC v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1996
(mem.) (2013).
436. Brett Norman, Court Blocks FDA Warning Labels Appeal, POLITICO (Dec. 6,
2012),
http://www.politico.com/story/2012/12/court-blocks-fda-tobacco-warninglabels-appeal-84656.html.
437. Steve Almasy, FDA Change Course on Graphic Warning Labels for
Cigarettes, CNN (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/19/health/fda-graphictobacco-warnings.
438. Id.
439. ROCKNROLLA (Warner Bros. 2008).

